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Perverse Incentives Arising from the
Tax Provisions of Healthcare Reform:
Why Further Reforms Are Needed to
Prevent Avoidable Costs to Low- and
Moderate-Income Workers
DAVID GAMAGE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Affordable Care Act (ACA)' has been heralded as the signa-
ture achievement of the Obama Administration. 2 Called "Obama-
care" by some, the ACA is the most extensive reform to the U.S.
health care system since the creation of Medicare and Medicaid in
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Article are solely those of the author; nothing discussed herein should be attributed in any
way to the Treasury Department, the Obama Administration, or to anyone other than the
author.
Many thanks to Amer Ahmed, Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Andrew Bradt, John Brooks, Ruth
Colker, Stavros Gadinis, Brian Galle, Mark Gergen, Itai Grinberg, David Herzig, Calvin
Johnson, Shana Lavarreda, Sarah Lawsky, Ben Leff, Shanna Lehrman, Stephanie
McMahon, Amy Monahan, Susie Morse, Annette Nellen, Jason Oh, Leigh Osofsky,
Katherine Pratt, Eric Rakowski, Shruti Rana, Bertrall Ross, Deborah Schenk, Darien
Shanske, Rachel Stern, Karen Tani, Jennifer Urban, Dennis Ventry, four anonymous
reviewers, the other organizers and participants at the 2011 NYU-UCLA Tax Policy
Conference, the 7th Annual Junior Tax Scholars Workshop, the Spring 2012 Northern
California Tax Roundtable, and the Berkeley Law Junior Working Ideas Group, and the
Tax Law Review editorial staff.
1 The "Affordable Care Act" refers jointly to the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), and the Health Care and
Education and Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029.
The "Affordable Care Act" is the Obama Administration's preferred term for referring
to these health care reform acts and is the term used in the regulations interpreting the
acts. See, e.g., Prop. Reg. § 1.36B-l(b), 76 Fed. Reg. 50931, 50939 (Aug. 17, 2011). Conse-
quently, I also refer to these health care reform acts as the "ACA" throughout this Article.
2 See, e.g., Pema Levy, How the Obama Administration Is Jeopardizing Health Care
Reform, The New Republic (Oct. 3, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/
95631/supreme-court-case-medicaid-california-affordable-care-act (referring to the ACA
as the Obama Administration's "signature policy achievement").
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1965. 3 With respect to tax administration, the ACA is arguably the
most significant attempt ever to reform social welfare policy through
the tax code. 4
This Article has two primary goals. First, this Article explains how
key tax-related provisions of the ACA will interact. Upon their com-
ing into effect in 2014, these tax-related provisions of the ACA will
create a new framework that will dramatically alter the U.S. system
for health care finance. It will be important for anyone interested in
either tax policy or health care policy to understand this new frame-
work. Yet, as is often the case when predicting how tax provisions
affect taxpayer behavior, the devil is in the details. This Article at-
tempts to analyze the interplay between key tax-related provisions of
the ACA at a level of detail sufficient for predicting taxpayer behavior
while still remaining accessible to readers who are not tax lawyers.
Second, this Article argues that further reform is needed to prevent
this new framework from creating avoidable costs for low- and moder-
ate-income workers. The ACA promises many improvements to U.S.
health care.5 I should perhaps note at the outset that I support the
ACA; I expect the ACA's benefits to exceed its costs. 6 Yet supporting
the ACA should not make one blind to the ACA's flaws. Our choices
need not be limited to either accepting the ACA as is, with all its
warts, or else repealing the ACA in its entirety. Instead, this Article
argues for maintaining some of the major tax-related provisions of the
ACA while enacting further reforms so as to prevent avoidable costs
to low- and moderate-income workers.
In the absence of further reform, this Article explains how the ACA
will impose effective taxes with respect to low- and moderate-income
workers, thereby reducing these workers' employment opportunities
3 See Comm. on the Robert Wood Johnson Found. Initiative on the Future of Nursing,
Nat. Acads. Inst. of Med., The Future of Nursing: Leading Change, Advancing Health 2
(2011), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.phprecordid=12956 ("The ACA repre-
sents the broadest changes to the health care system since the 1965 creation of the Medi-
care and Medicaid programs and is expected to provide insurance coverage for an
additional 32 million previously uninsured Americans.").
4 See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Health-Related Tax Provisions of PPACA and HCERA:
Contingent, Complex, Incremental and Lacking Cost Controls 5-38 (Cardozo Legal Stud.
Res. Paper No. 301, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633556 (summarizing the
many tax provisions of the ACA).
5 See The White House, A More Secure Future: What the New Health Law Means for
You and Your Family, http://www.whitehouse.gov/healthreform/healthcare-overview (last
visited July 21, 2012).
6 My assessment that the ACA's benefits are likely to exceed its costs is subject to the
caveat that the ACA may not be successfully implemented in all states. Indeed, my pri-
mary doubts about the ACA arise from concerns about whether the ACA will be effective
in the face of attempts to obstruct its successful implementation. That said, evaluating the
ACA as a whole is beyond the scope of this Article.
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and creating a number of other economic and social harms.7 When a
law or regulation deters economic actors from the choices that they
otherwise would have made, we can say that the law or regulation
imposes "effective taxes" on those choices.8 For the most part then,
effective taxes are essentially synonymous with "perverse incentives."9
This Article argues that, once key provisions of the ACA come into
effect in 2014, the ACA will impose effective taxes on a number of
important decisions affecting low- and moderate-income Americans,
including:
e The ACA will deter low- and moderate-income taxpayers from
accepting jobs with employers that offer affordable health insurance.
* The ACA will discourage many low- and moderate-income tax-
payers from attempting to increase their household incomes.
* The ACA will penalize many low- and moderate-income taxpay-
ers who choose to marry, and will incentivize many low- and moder-
ate-income taxpayers to divorce.
* The ACA will dissuade employers from hiring low- and moder-
ate-income taxpayers, and will encourage employers to reduce the sal-
aries paid to some low- and moderate-income employees.
* The ACA will prompt employers to shift some low- and moder-
ate-income employees from full-time positions to part-time positions.
7 As the phrase is used in this Article, "low- and moderate-income workers" generally
refers to workers with household incomes higher than 133% of the federal poverty line and
lower than (at most) 400% of the federal poverty line. Workers with household incomes
below 133% of the federal poverty line will generally qualify for Medicaid, such that most
of this Article's analysis will not apply. For analysis regarding the high-end threshold for
"low- and moderate-income workers," and for charts showing how percentages of the fed-
eral poverty line relate to actual household incomes, see Section II.C.
8 The term "effective taxes" is used to contrast with explicit taxes or statutory taxes.
Unlike the latter terms, effective taxes include all of the ways in which a law or regulation
increases the price of one economic decision as compared to alternative economic
decisions.
9 More precisely, effective taxes are equivalent to perverse incentives to the extent that
the effective taxes lead to harmful changes in behavior. But unless there is some reason for
deterring the choices economic actors would have made in the absence of effective taxes
(for example, externalities), effective taxes create perverse incentives almost by definition,
following the baseline assumption that it is generally undesirable for governments to alter
the incentives of economic actors unless there is a good reason for doing so.
I primarily use the term effective taxes in this Article because I do not mean to imply
that there is anything inherently harmful about the choices economic actors make as a
result of the effective taxes. For instance, if a low-income taxpayer decides not to accept a
job, this decision may sometimes be in the best interests of both the taxpayer and society.
But if a law or regulation imposes effective taxes that result in a low-income taxpayer not
accepting a job that the taxpayer otherwise would have accepted, then this change in be-
havior will generally harm society. The term effective taxes captures this distinction better
than does the term perverse incentives, and I thus use the term effective taxes in those
instances in which it is important to capture this distinction. In other instances, I use the
two terms interchangeably.
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e The ACA will tempt employers to implement a number of other
costly strategies for circumventing the ACA's employer mandates and
penalties.
* The ACA will induce employers to stop offering "affordable"
health insurance to at least some low- and moderate-income employ-
ees, and, if this occurs to a significant enough degree, the budgetary
cost of the ACA may greatly exceed the official projections issued by
the Congressional Budget Office.
We ought perhaps to accept these effective taxes were they a neces-
sary cost of achieving the ACA's many positive goals. But the ACA
could have been drafted to attain its desirable ends without creating
most of the effective taxes analyzed by this Article. Moreover, there
is still hope of enacting further reforms so as to preserve the ACA's
positive features while mitigating or eliminating these effective taxes.
Ideally, these further reforms would be enacted at the federal level, if
the federal government fails to act, however, this Article explains how
state governments might pass legislation to mitigate the ACA's effec-
tive taxes.
The source of most of these effective taxes is the mismatch that the
ACA will create between the tax subsidies available for employer-
sponsored health insurance and those available for the health insur-
ance purchased by individuals. Most higher-income taxpayers will re-
ceive much larger tax subsidies if they are offered employer-
sponsored health insurance, whereas most lower-income taxpayers
will receive much larger tax subsidies if they are not offered afforda-
ble employer-sponsored health insurance. This mismatch in the avail-
able tax subsidies results because the ACA maintains most of the
previously existing tax benefits for employer-sponsored health insur-
ance (which primarily benefit higher-income taxpayers), whereas the
new tax subsidies that the ACA will create for health insurance pur-
chased by individuals will primarily benefit lower-income taxpayers. 10
If the ACA had instead transformed the previously existing tax ben-
efits for employer-sponsored health insurance into refundable tax
credits structured in a similar fashion to the ACA's new tax subsidies,
then most of the perverse incentives this Article analyzes would have
been completely alleviated.11 Moreover, many commentators have al-
10 Taxpayers will be ineligible for these new subsidies if the taxpayers' employers offer
affordable health insurance.
11 The exception is the perverse incentives some low- and moderate-income taxpayers
will face to avoid increasing their incomes. Unlike the other perverse incentives analyzed
in this Article, these perverse incentives would remain even if the previously existing tax
benefits for employer-sponsored health insurance were transformed into refundable tax
credits as this Article recommends. These perverse incentives are a result of the progres-
sivity built into the ACA's new tax subsidies, rather than resulting from the mismatch the
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ready called for reforming the previously existing tax benefits for em-
ployer-sponsored health insurance in exactly this fashion, arguing that
these tax benefits are regressive and that they encourage excess health
care consumption. 12 This Article explains why failing to reform the
previously existing tax benefits for employer-sponsored health insur-
ance will create far more harm once key provisions of the ACA come
into effect in 2014.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II explains why employers
provided health insurance prior to the ACA, and Part III explains
how the ACA will alter employers' incentives as to whether to offer
health insurance. Understanding how the ACA will affect employers'
incentives is key to understanding the ACA's effective taxes. Parts I
and III are directed toward readers who have not previously im-
mersed themselves in the details of the ACA. 13 Readers who already
have an in-depth understanding of the tax provisions of the ACA may
wish to start reading with Part IV.
Part IV explains how the ACA will create effective taxes imposing
costs on low- and moderate-income workers, and Part V concludes by
explaining how these effective taxes could be mitigated or avoided by
reforming the tax benefits available for employer-sponsored health in-
surance. This Article ends with a call for action. The ACA is an im-
pressive accomplishment, but further reform is urgently needed to
prevent the ACA from imposing unnecessary costs on low- and mod-
ACA will create between the tax subsidies for individually purchased health insurance as
compared to employer-provided health insurance.
12 See, e.g., Urban Inst. & Brookings Inst. Tax Pol'y Ctr., The Tax Policy Briefing Book:
A Citizens' Guide for the 2008 Election and Beyond, at 11-5-8 to -9 (2008), available at
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/upload/Elements/I-5KEYELEMENTSHealthInsurance
andHealthCare.final.pdf; Bradley W. Joondeph, Tax Policy and Health Care Reform: Re-
thinking the Tax Treatment of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance, 1995 BYU L. Rev.
1229, 1229-30; Jonathan Gruber, The Tax Exclusion for Employer-Sponsored Health Insur-
ance *1-*3 (NBER, Working Paper No. 15766, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/pa-
pers/w15766; Jason Roffenbender, Employer-Based Health Insurance: Why Congress
Should Cap Tax Benefits Consistently, Backgrounder No. 2214, , at 2, 5-6, Dec. 5, 2008,
available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/12/Employer-Based-Health-
Insurance-Why-Congress-Should-Cap-Tax-Benefits-Consistently; Paul N. Van de Water,
Limiting the Tax Exclusion for Employer-Sponsored Insurance Can Help Pay for Health
Reform: Universal Coverage May Be Out of Reach Otherwise 1-2 (Ctr. on Budget Poli-
cies & Priorities, 2009), available at http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=2832;
President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair, and Pro-Growth Propos-
als to Fix America's Tax System 78-82 (2005).
13 This Article makes no attempt to summarize all of the provisions of the ACA or even
all of the tax provisions of the ACA. For a summary and explanation of the ACA, see
generally Families USA, A Summary of the Health Reform Law (2010), available at http://
www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/health-reform/summary-of-the-heaIth-reform-law.pdf;
Nat'l Ctr. for Pol'y Analysis, What Does Health Reform Mean for You? A Consumer's
Guide (2010), available at http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/What-Does-Health-Reform-Mean-for-
You-A-Consumers-Guide.pdf.
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erate-income workers beginning in 2014. If the federal government
fails to act, then this Article exhorts state governments to pass legisla-
tion to mitigate the ACA's effective taxes.
Before proceeding, it may be useful to emphasize a few caveats.
First, this Article does not argue that the ACA on balance will be
harmful for low- and moderate income workers or for any other popu-
lation.14 It is important to understand the costs that the ACA will
impose in order to design reform proposals so as to mitigate these
costs; but in evaluating the ACA, these costs must be weighed against
the ACA's benefits. 15 Second, this Article makes no attempt to evalu-
ate the ACA as a whole or to compare the ACA to alternative reform
proposals. I do note that I support the ACA in order to clarify that I
intend this Article's recommendations to be in the vein of friendly
amendments, but I do not attempt to justify my support for the ACA
in this Article. Third, this Article does not attempt to quantify the
magnitude of the ACA's costs in any rigorous fashion. Fourth, this
Article offers only a rough outline for how the federal or state govern-
ments might enact reforms so as to mitigate these costs.
In short, this Article reports preliminary analysis that I plan to de-
velop further in future work. Because the ACA's new framework for
regulating health care finance is scheduled to come into effect in 2014,
I have concluded that it is important to make this preliminary analysis
available now, rather than waiting until it is fully complete.
Policymakers working to implement the ACA's new framework
face tight deadlines for making administrative decisions and for set-
14 In my view, assessing the ACA as a whole largely boils down to the importance one
places on providing affordable health care options for those with pre-existing conditions.
Any health care reform designed to provide affordable care options for those with pre-
existing conditions must either rely on government provided health care (that is, "social-
ized medicine") or else on a hybrid system similar to the ACA. Because I believe it impor-
tant to provide affordable health care options for those with pre-existing conditions, I
conclude that the ACA's benefits will exceed its costs, even though I wish that the ACA
were better designed so as to avoid creating unnecessary costs such as those discussed in
this Article. But analysts who do not place a high importance on providing affordable care
options for those with pre-existing conditions may well conclude that the ACA's costs ex-
ceed its benefits. In any case, both assessing the larger issues related to pre-existing condi-
tions and evaluating the ACA as a whole are beyond the scope of this Article. For
instance, a deeper assessment of issues related to pre-existing conditions should distinguish
between pre-existing conditions that result from the choices made by taxpayers and those
that are outside of taxpayers' control, yet I gloss over this distinction in this Article for ease
of exposition and because the distinction is not important for this Article's purposes.
15 It may also be worth noting that the major distributional impacts of the ACA will
likely be to benefit less healthy populations at the expense of healthier populations. Al-
though the ACA will have distributional impacts with respect to income groups, these will
arguably be less important than will be the distributional impacts that will occur within
income groups-as less healthy members of each income group are likely to benefit at the
expense of healthier members of the income group.
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ting up the infrastructure that will be required for the new framework
to function successfully. Private-sector lawyers and consultants simi-
larly face limited time frames for familiarizing themselves with the
ACA's new provisions in order to advise clients. By explaining how
key tax-related provisions of the ACA will interact, I hope this Article
will offer a useful guide to these audiences. If there is any hope of
either the federal or state governments designing legislation to miti-
gate the costs analyzed in this Article before these costs materialize,
then work on such legislation must likely begin soon. Hence, with
apologies for the incomplete state of this Article's analysis, and with
promises of elaboration in future work, I hope that this Article will
help inform conversations about the implications of ACA's new
framework and about how we should strive to improve this new
framework through further reforms.
II. WHY EMPLOYERS PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE
PRIOR TO THE ACA
Prior to the ACA, why did most Americans receive health insur-
ance from their employers? 16 One might alternatively ask why Amer-
icans did not generally receive food, cars, or movie tickets from their
employers. As with health insurance, employees like receiving food,
cars, and movie tickets, and often choose to spend their own money
on these items when employers compensate them with cash wages.
But each employee places a different relative value on food, cars,
movie tickets, and similar goods, and employees thus generally prefer
to receive cash wages and then decide for themselves how much of
each of these goods to purchase rather than having their employers
involved in those consumption decisions. 17
Of course, sometimes employers provide these and other in kind
fringe benefits because providing those benefits serves a business pur-
16 See Allison K. Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented
Markets, and Health Reform, 36 Am. J.L. & Med. 7, 18 (2010) ("The majority of privately
insured Americans still obtain their health insurance coverage through an employer .... ");
Robert J. Mills, Health Insurance Coverage: 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p60-215.pdf; Amy B. Monahan, The Complex Rela-
tionship Between Taxes and Health Insurance 1 (Univ. of Minnesota Law Sch., Legal Stud.
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 10-01, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1531322.
17 To the extent it costs employers resources to provide health insurance, employers
could instead transfer those funds directly to employees in the form of higher wages. Each
employee could then choose how much of these wages to spend on health insurance. By
spending resources to subsidize health insurance rather than on wages, employers thus
limit their employees' options for how to use the fruits of their labor.
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pose other than compensating employees. 18 For example, an em-
ployer might provide an employee with a car if the employer wants
the employee to use that car for work-related travel. But outside of
such non-compensation-motivated scenarios, employers generally
should only provide in kind benefits in lieu of cash wages if either: (1)
the employer can provide the in kind benefit at a lower price than
what it would cost for the employee to purchase the benefit, or (2) if it
is tax favorable for the employer to provide the in kind benefit in lieu
of cash wages. 19
As the remainder of this Part explains, both of these factors moti-
vated employers to provide health insurance in lieu of cash wages
prior to the ACA. Due primarily to adverse selection and risk classifi-
cation, employers were able to offer better quality health insurance at
a lower cost as compared to what individual employees could
purchase on their own. And primarily as a result of the tax exclu-
sions,20 employer-provided health insurance was subsidized as com-
pared to the alternative health insurance options that employees
might purchase from the market using their after-tax wages.
A. The Non-Tax Advantages of Employer-Provided Health
Insurance Prior to the ACA
Insurance differs from ordinary market goods. The amount an indi-
vidual pays for insurance premiums over her lifetime may be either
more or less than the cost of the medical care paid for by her insur-
ance plan, partially depending on whether the individual's medical
costs end up being higher or lower than the average medical costs
incurred by similar individuals. A primary reason why individuals
purchase health insurance is to protect themselves against the risk that
their future medical costs may end up being higher than expected (and
higher than the individual will be able to afford).
This feature of health insurance leads to the twin problems of ad-
verse selection and risk classification. Adverse selection occurs when
individuals have better knowledge about their expected future health
costs than do insurance companies. Because insurance companies can
18 For a general discussion, see Michael Livingston & David Gamage, Taxation: Law,
Planning, and Policy 92-93 (2d ed. 2010).
It is perhaps also worth noting that the U.S. system's reliance on employer-provided
health insurance originated at least partially with the wage and price controls implemented
during World War II. Restricted in their ability to compensate employees with cash wages,
employers turned to fringe benefits like employer-provided health insurance. See id.
19 Alternative reasons why employers might provide fringe benefits in lieu of cash wages
might arise from regulatory pressures, employer paternalism, or historical practices. Id.
But these motives are less important for the purposes of this Article.
20 IRC §§ 105, 106.
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only price insurance based on the insurance companies' expectations
about an individual's future health costs, individuals who know that
their future health costs are likely to be higher than insurance compa-
nies anticipate will often find that health insurance offers them a good
deal. Conversely, individuals who know that their future health care
costs are likely to be lower than insurance companies anticipate will
often find that health insurance offers them a poor deal.21
Adverse selection results when the former (high-cost) individuals
purchase more health insurance because they realize that it offers
them a good deal, while the latter (low-cost) individuals purchase less
health insurance because they realize that insurance offers them a rel-
atively poor deal.22 When high-cost individuals enter an insurance
market, and low-cost individuals exit the market, the inevitable result
is higher costs and rising insurance premiums. 23 As insurance premi-
ums rise to reflect the higher costs of the insured pool, an ever larger
group of individuals will find that insurance offers them a relatively
poor deal.24 These dynamics can create "adverse selection death spi-
rals" through repeated cycles of relatively low-cost individuals leaving
the market, leading to higher premiums, which then leads to a new
group of relatively low-cost individuals leaving the market, which
leads to even higher premiums, and so on.25
Highly related to adverse selection, the nature of health insurance
also incentivizes insurance issuers to engage in the practice of risk
classification.26 Insurance companies can use risk classification tech-
niques to defend against adverse selection. The better information an
insurance company can obtain about individuals' future health costs,
the more accurately the insurance company can price its policies to
21 Of course, whether insurance offers a "good deal" involves more than just a compari-
son of premiums paid to health expenses reimbursed. Health insurance is meant to be
insurance, after all, and being insured against risks can be valuable even if those risks do
not end up materializing. But the comparison of premiums paid to expected reimburse-
ments is still an important component of whether an insurance policy provides sufficient
value to be worth the cost.
22 Monahan, note 16, at 8-9.
23 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Econ. 488, 489-90 (1970); Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stig-
litz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Im-
perfect Information, 90 Q.J. Econ. 629, 634-38 (1976).
24 For a more in depth elaboration of an analogous dynamic, see David Gamage & Al-
lon Kedem, Commodification and Contract Formation, Placing the Consideration Doctrine
on Stronger Foundations, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1299, 1338-47 (2006).
25 See David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Adverse Selection in Health Insur-
ance, 1 Frontiers in Health Pol'y Res. 1, 3-9 (1998).
26 For a discussion of risk classification (alternatively sometimes called risk selection),
see Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care Reform
by Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 Va. L. Rev. 125, 133-36 (2011).
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reflect the expected health costs of insured individuals. 27 More prob-
lematically, if insurance companies can exclude relatively high-cost in-
dividuals from their policies, then the insurance companies can keep
premiums lower while generating higher profits. 28 Consequently, in-
surance companies invest considerable resources toward distinguish-
ing high-cost individuals from low-cost individuals and in developing
techniques for making their policies more attractive to low-cost indi-
viduals and less attractive to high-cost individuals.29 These practices
can generate high administrative costs. 30
Due to the problems of adverse selection and risk classification,
prior to the ACA, insurance policies offered on the individual market
were generally of comparatively lower quality and higher price as
compared to employer-provided insurance policies.31 The "individual
market" refers to when individuals purchase insurance policies di-
rectly, rather than through their employers or through government
programs. 32 According to one study, in 2005, "nearly 3 in 5 adults
who applied for coverage in the individual market failed to find a plan
they could afford because they were denied coverage, charged higher
prices, or had a health problem excluded from coverage. ' 33 Notably,
insurance companies could deny coverage to individuals with pre-ex-
isting conditions-a practice banned by the ACA.34 Individuals who
insurance companies assumed to be high risk or who had pre-existing
conditions thus found it exceedingly difficult to purchase meaningful
insurance on the individual market except at exorbitant costs. 35
27 David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insur-
ance, 2 Yale J. Health Pol'y L. & Ethics 23, 31-33 (2001).
28 Insurance companies may thus often find it more profitable to focus on designing
policies so as to effectuate risk classification than to design policies so as to offer better
health care products to a wider range of insureds.
29 Hoffman, note 16, at 28-29.
30 See id. (comparing estimates for administrative costs on the individual market where
risk classification is possible to administrative costs for employer-provided health insur-
ance where risk classification is less likely); Monahan, note 16, at 3 n.8.
31 See Michelle M. Doty, Sara R. Collins, Jennifer L. Nicholson & Sheila D. Rustgi,
Failure to Protect: Why the Individual Insurance Market Is Not a Viable Option for Most
U.S. Families 1-3 (Commonwealth Fund, 2009), available at http://www.commonwealth
fund.org/-/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2009/Jul/Failure%20to%20Protect/
1300_Doty-failure-to-protectindividual insmarket ibyv2.pdf; Melinda Beeuwkes Bun-
tin, Susan M. Marquis & Jill M. Yegian, The Role of the Individual Health Insurance Mar-
ket and Prospects for Change, 23 Health Aff. 79, 79-81 (2004).
32 See Buntin et al., note 31.
33 Hoffman, note 16, at 52 (citing Sara R. Collins, Jennifer L. Kriss, Karen Davis,
Michelle M. Doty & Alyssa L. Holmgren, Squeezed: Why Rising Exposure to Health Care
Costs Threatens the Health and Financial Well-Being of American Families 4 (Common-
wealth Fund, 2006), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr-doc/Col-
lins-squeezedrisinghltcarecosts_953.pdf.
34 ACA § 1201, 124 Stat. at 154; Monahan, note 16, at 17.
35 Hoffman, note 16, at 53.
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Exacerbating these problems, health insurance policies can be very
complex, and individuals often find it difficult to understand exactly
what coverage a policy offers with respect to the wide variety of possi-
ble future health costs the individual may incur. 36 Hence, absent regu-
lation, insurance companies often find it profitable to design policies
that appeal to younger, healthier insureds while reducing benefits to
insureds who develop expensive health conditions. 37 And even when
faced with regulations designed to prevent these practices, insurance
companies have proven their ability to engage in risk classification
through more subtle (and often more administratively costly) means. 38
For these reasons, prior to the ACA, most commentators agreed
that the individual market for health insurance was a disaster.39 In
contrast, employer-provided health insurance largely solved the
problems of the individual market. 40 An employer's workforce is
grouped together for reasons other than their health risks, and em-
ployers can thus either market their workforce to insurance compa-
nies as a group or else self-insure their workforce with much less risk
of adverse selection.41 Employer-provided coverage similarly mini-
mizes the costs of risk classification. Although employers in theory
could exclude their high-cost employees from insurance policies or
charge those employees more, the rest of the employee's workforce
might learn about these practices, which could harm employee morale
36 See Jeffrey Liebman & Richard Zeckhauser, Simple Humans, Complex Insurance,
Subtle Subsidies 3-14 (Tax Pol'y Ctr., 2008), available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
tpccontent/healthconference.zeckhauser.pdf; John Goodman, Complex Systems, Part I,
John Goodman's Health Policy Blog (Oct. 19, 2011), http://healthblog.ncpa.org/complex-
systems-part-i/; John Goodman, Complex Systems, Part II, John Goodman's Health Policy
Blog (Nov. 9, 2011), http://healthblog.ncpa.org/complex-systems-part-ii/.
37 See Nicholas Bagley & Jill R. Horwitz, Commentary, Why It's Called the Affordable
Care Act, 110 Mich. Law Rev. First Impressions 1, 5 (2011), available at http://www.michi-
ganlawreview.org/assets/fi/110/bagleyhorwitz.pdf; Beth C. Fuchs, Expanding the Individual
Health Insurance Market: Lessons from the State Reforms of the 1990s 10 (Robert Wood
Johnson Found. 2004), available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/research20114.expandingin-
surance.report.pdf; Peter Harbage, Too Sick for Health Care: How Insurers Limit and
Deny Care in the Individual Health Insurance Market 4-5 (Ctr. for Am. Progress, 2009),
available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/07/toosick.html.
38 See Am. Acad. of Actuaries, Risk Classification in Individually Purchased Voluntary
Medical Expense Insurance 3-7 (1999), available at http://actuary.org/pdf/health/risk.pdf;
Am. Acad. of Actuaries, Risk Classification in the Voluntary Individual Health Insurance
Market 3-6 (2009), available at http://www.actuary.org/pdf/health/risk-mar09.pdf; Bagley
& Horwitz, note 37, at 4-6.
39 See, e.g., Joseph Newhouse, Assessing Health Reform's Impact on Four Key Groups
of Americans, 29 Health Aff. 1714, 1716 (2010) ("the individual and small group market is
dysfunctional"); Doty et al., note 31, at 8-9.
40 Hyman & Hall, note 27, at 32-35.
41 Stuart M. Butler, Evolving Beyond Traditional Employer-Sponsored Health Insur-
ance 7 (Brookings Inst., 2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/
files/papers/2007/5/healthcare%20butler/200705butler.
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and retention. In practice, employers appear to mostly provide health
care policies that benefit their entire workforce. 42
Moreover, employers can and do assist their employees with the
complexity of the health insurance decision-making process by func-
tioning as intermediaries.43 Employers' human resources departments
support employees by screening health insurance options, helping em-
ployees select from among the options provided, and aiding employ-
ees who have disputes about reimbursements or coverage provided.44
In sum, prior to the ACA, employers could offer their employees
better health insurance options at considerably lower costs than what
was available on the individual market. Whereas the individual mar-
ket suffered from adverse selection, risk classification, and other infor-
mation problems, employers could largely solve these problems by
creating insurance groups unrelated to health costs and by functioning
as information intermediaries. 45 Thus, a major reason why employers
offered their employees subsidized health insurance was that employ-
ers' advantages in providing health insurance made that insurance
more valuable to employees than the foregone cash wages.
B. The Tax Advantages of Employer-Provided Health Insurance
Prior to the ACA
Not only was employer-provided health insurance generally
cheaper and better than what could be purchased on the individual
market prior to the ACA, but employer-provided health insurance
was also significantly tax-advantaged as compared to insurance pur-
chased on the individual market. The primary sources of this tax ad-
vantage were the tax exclusions for employer-provided health
insurance. 46 Employees who received subsidized health insurance
from their employers could exclude the value of those subsidies from
42 Id.; Hyman & Hall, note 27, at 30 ("Surveys and focus groups indicate that employers
do a reasonably good job reflecting their workers' values and preferences, just as one
would expect in a reasonably competitive labor market.").
43 Hyman & Hall, note 27, at 33-35.
44 Id.
45 But see Butler, note 41, at 8-10 (arguing that small employers do not enjoy the same
advantages with respect to providing insurance as do large employers and that relying on
employer-provided insurance creates other problems such as interfering with job mobility).
This Article is primarily focused on large employers and their employees. There are a
number of additional complicating considerations that should be taken into account in ex-
tending this Article's analysis to small employers and the employees of small employers.
46 See Stan Dorn, Capping the Tax Exclusion of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance:
Is Equity Feasible? 1 (Urban Inst., 2009), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/
411894_cappingthetaxexclusion.pdf.
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taxable income.47 Employer-subsidized health insurance was also ex-
cludable from payroll taxes. 48 Moreover, by having their employers
establish a cafeteria plan, employees could also reduce their taxable
income by the amounts the employees contributed to pay for health
insurance premiums.49 Hence, even in the absence of any employer
subsidies, employees could pay for employer-provided health insur-
ance entirely with pretax dollars.50
The exclusion for employer-provided health insurance is the largest
federal tax expenditure. 51 The Joint Committee on Taxation esti-
mated the value of the exclusion to be worth $246.1 billion annually in
2007.52
Self-employed individuals could also enjoy similar health care tax
benefits to those available for employees. 53 Most importantly, self-
employed individuals could deduct health insurance payments for
them and for their dependents. 54 The rules for self-employed individ-
uals mostly mirrored the rules for individuals receiving employer-pro-
vided health insurance. 55 A taxpayer, however, could not claim the
self-employed health insurance deduction for any month in which ei-
ther the taxpayer or the taxpayer's spouse was eligible to participate
in an employer-sponsored health plan.56 The Joint Committee on
47 IRC §§ 105(b), 106(a); for a broader discussion of the exclusion, see Livingston &
Gamage, note 18, at 98-99; Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Taxes and Healthcare, 124 Tax Notes 889,
889-92 (Aug. 31, 2009).
48 IRC §§ 3101(a), (b), 3121(a)(2); Wiedenbeck, note 47, at 892.
49 IRC § 125; Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 110th Cong., Tax Expenditures for Health Care
(Comm.Print 2008), available at http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=
1193.
50 Monahan, note 16, at 3.
51 See Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 112th Cong., Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for
Fiscal Years 2011-2015, at 42 (Comm. Print 2012), available at https:/lwww.jct.gov/publica-
tions.html?func=sartdown*id=4386. For discussions of the tax expenditure concept, see
Edward Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax Expenditures Distort
Our Budget and Our Political Processes, 36 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 1, 2-4 (2010); Daniel N.
Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 Tax L. Rev. 187, 187-188
(2004).
52 Joint Comm. on Tax'n, note 49, at 2. This estimate is for the aggregate of the tax
expenditures from the income tax and the payroll tax.
53 Supplementing the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance and the self-
employed health insurance deduction were a number of other tax benefits related to em-
ployer-provided health care. As these benefits are less important for the purposes of this
Article, I do not discuss them here. For discussions of these other tax benefits, see Fred T.
Goldberg & Susannah Camic, Legal Solutions in Health Reform: Tax Credits for Health
Insurance 4-6 (2009), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/oneillinstitute/national-
health-lawllegal-solutions-in-health-reformPapers/Tax.pdf; Joint Comm. on Tax'n, note 49,
at 4-33; Wiedenbeck, note 47, at 890-97.
54 IRC § 162(l).
55 Goldberg & Camic, note 53, at 5.
56 Joint Comm. on Tax'n, note 49.
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Taxation estimated the value of the health insurance deduction for
self-employed individuals to be worth $4.8 billion annually in 2007. 57
In contrast, no equivalent tax benefits were available for unem-
ployed taxpayers or for employed taxpayers whose employers did not
offer health insurance.58 There was no generally applicable tax deduc-
tion or exclusion for health care expenditures by unemployed taxpay-
ers or by employed taxpayers lacking employer-provided health
insurance. 59 These taxpayers could claim an itemized deduction to the
extent that their unreimbursed medical expenses exceeded 7.5% of
adjusted gross income.60 But this deduction required taxpayers to
forgo the standard deduction, and the 7.5% threshold made the de-
duction of minimal value for most taxpayers. The Joint Committee on
Taxation estimated the value of this limited itemized deduction for
medical expenses to be only $8.7 billion annually in 2007, as compared
to the combined value of $250.9 billion for the exclusion for employer-
provided health insurance and the self-employed health insurance
deduction.61
The net result was a significant tax advantage for employer-pro-
vided health insurance as compared to insurance purchased on the
individual market. Consider an example of this tax disparity (quoted
from Amy Monahan):
For example, assume that Taxpayer A and Taxpayer B desire
the same insurance coverage, an individual policy that costs
$3,750. Taxpayer A is offered her desired coverage through
her employer, while Taxpayer B is not. Both taxpayers are in
the 25% marginal rate bracket. Taxpayer A needs to earn
only $3,750 in wages to purchase such coverage, while Tax-
payer B must earn $5,000 in wages to have sufficient after-
tax funds available for his purchase. If we take into account
payroll taxes of 7.65% and an assumed state income tax rate
of 5%, the amount of wages necessary to pay for a $3,750
policy rises to $5,162. . . . Taxpayer A receives an effective
57 Joint Comm. on Tax'n, note 51, at 2. This estimate is for the aggregate of the tax
expenditures from the income tax and the payroll tax.
58 Taxpayers whose incomes were sufficiently low might qualify for Medicaid.
59 Joint Comm. on Tax'n, note 49, at 13; Monahan, note 16, at 3.
60 IRC § 213. The 7.5% threshold for deducting medical expenses will increase to 10%
in 2013. IRC § 213(a). Through 2016, taxpayers of age sixty-five and older will continue to
be able to use the old 7.5% threshold. IRC § 213(f).
61 Joint Comm. on Tax'n, note 51, at 2. These estimates are not directly comparable, as
different numbers of taxpayers are eligible for the different tax expenditures, among other
complications. Nevertheless, the enormous disparity between the size of the tax expendi-
tures for employer-provided health insurance as compared to those for individually pur-
chased insurance is still suggestive as a rough indication that employer-provided health
insurance is far more tax subsidized than is individually purchased health insurance.
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subsidy of $1,412 to purchase her health insurance coverage,
solely because her employer makes such coverage available
to her, and regardless of whether her employer makes any
contribution toward such coverage.62
III. How THE ACA WILL AFFECT INCENTIVES
TO OFFER HEALTH INSURANCE
Prior to the ACA, employers offered health insurance to their indi-
vidual employees both because employers could provide better qual-
ity health insurance at lower cost than what was available on the
individual market and because employer-provided health insurance
was significantly tax-advantaged. As this Part explains, the ACA will
dramatically alter both of these incentives. Once key provisions of the
ACA go into effect in 2014, employers will face a very different
calculus in deciding whether to offer health insurance to their individ-
ual employees.
A. The ACA's Improvements to the Health Insurance Available
on the Individual Market
A primary goal of the ACA was to fix the problems plaguing the
individual market for health insurance. 63 Most critically, the ACA
will impose open enrollment 64 and guaranteed renewal 65 requirements
on all health insurance plans offered in the individual and small group
markets so that these plans must accept all applicants for health insur-
ance.66 The ACA will further limit insurance issuers' ability to charge
applicants different prices based on their expected health risks. The
ACA will only allow health insurance issuers to vary their prices based
on four factors: the size of the applicant's family (for applicants seek-
ing family coverage), the geographic region in which the applicant re-
sides, the applicant's age, and whether the applicant uses tobacco.67
Even with respect to these factors, insurance issuers will be limited to
62 Monahan, note 16, at 3-4.
63 See Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1577, 1585-91 (2011).
64 PPACA, note 1, § 1201, 124 Stat. at 156 (amending the Public Health Service Act to
include § 2702, requiring that every health insurance issuer accept all applicants.)
65 Id. (amending the Public Health Service Act to include § 2703(a): "Except as pro-
vided in this section, if a health insurance issuer offers health insurance coverage in the
individual or group market, the issuer must renew or continue in force such coverage at the
option of the plan sponsor or the individual, as applicable.").
66 Baker, note 63, at 1588-89.
67 PPACA, note 1, § 1201, 124 Stat. at 155 (amending the Public Health Service Act to
forbid price discrimination except on the basis of age, family status, rating area, or tobacco
use.)
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charging their oldest applicants no more than three times the prices
charged to their youngest applicants and to charging tobacco users no
more than one and a half times the prices charged to nonsmokers. 68
In effect, the ACA will prevent insurance plans from discriminating
against applicants with pre-existing health conditions.
More generally, these provisions of the ACA will significantly limit
insurers' ability to engage in risk classification. Yet, without further
regulation, limiting insurers' ability to engage in risk classification
could exacerbate problems related to adverse selection, potentially
undermining the entire individual market. The ACA thus also in-
cludes a number of provisions meant to combat adverse selection.
The most important of these is the individual mandate. 69 The individ-
ual mandate establishes penalties for citizens who do not obtain
health insurance constituting "minimum essential coverage. ' 70 In es-
sence, the individual mandate is intended to incentivize healthier indi-
viduals to obtain insurance coverage so as to prevent adverse selection
problems.
In order to further facilitate reforming the individual market for
health insurance, the ACA directs the states to create and administer
Affordable Insurance Exchanges ("Exchanges"). 71 These Exchanges
are to function as regulated marketplaces from which individuals can
purchase health insurance. If a state does not create an Exchange,
then the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) will be
empowered to establish and operate an Exchange on behalf of the
state.72 The ACA instructs the states to establish risk adjustment
mechanisms so that insurance plans that end up with a disproportion-
ately low-risk group of insureds will be assessed charges to be used to
compensate plans that end up with a disproportionately high-risk
group of insureds.73 The Exchanges will likely administer these risk
adjustment policies.74 Additionally, the Exchanges will regulate the
insurance policies offered to consumers and will act as information
intermediaries to aid consumers in selecting insurance plans.75
The ACA makes generous premium tax credits available for low-
and moderate-income taxpayers purchasing health insurance from an
68 Id., § 1201, 124 Stat. at 155-56 amending the Public Health Service Act to include
§ 2701.
69 IRC § 5000A. For discussions of the individual mandate, see generally Hoffman, note
16; Zelinsky, note 4, at 17-26.
70 IRC § 5000A (b), (c).
71 42 U.S.C. § 18031; Prop. Reg. § 1.36B-5, 76 Fed. Reg. 50931, 50939 (Aug. 17, 2011).
72 42 U.S.C. § 18041.
73 42 U.S.C. § 18063.
74 Baker, note 63, at 1591.
75 Id. at 1590-91.
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Exchange. 76 When combined with the individual mandate, the pre-
mium tax credits should help to ensure that there will be a critical
mass of insureds purchasing health insurance from the Exchanges.
The premium tax credits also serve an important role in making health
insurance affordable, which is particularly important since the individ-
ual mandate will require individuals to purchase health insurance.77
Whereas the individual mandate combats adverse selection by penal-
izing taxpayers who do not purchase health insurance (that is, provid-
ing sticks), the premium tax credits incentivize taxpayers to purchase
health insurance (that is, providing carrots).
To the extent these policies prove effective, the Exchanges should at
least partially solve the problems that previously afflicted the individ-
ual market for health insurance. Prior to the ACA, employer-pro-
vided health insurance was superior to individual market offerings
because employers were able to mitigate risk classification and ad-
verse selection problems and to act as information intermediaries.
Similarly, the market reform provisions of the ACA are designed to
combat risk classification problems, while the individual mandate and
premium tax credits are designed to mitigate adverse selection
problems. The Exchanges should further mitigate both risk classifica-
tion and adverse selection problems while functioning as information
intermediaries.
It remains to be seen how well these provisions of the ACA will
function in fixing the problems that previously plagued the individual
market.78 If these provisions are sufficiently effective, insurance poli-
cies offered on the Exchanges could potentially turn out to be of bet-
ter quality and lower cost than employer-provided offerings. Perhaps
more likely, if the provisions are only partially effective, employer-
provided insurance might retain its advantages over insurance policies
offered on the Exchanges, but with the advantages of employer-pro-
vided insurance significantly reduced as compared to the advantages
employer-provided insurance previously enjoyed over the insurance
policies available on the individual market prior to the ACA.
76 IRC § 36B; see also Lawrence Zelenak, Choosing Between Tax and Nontax Delivery
Mechanisms for Health Insurance Subsidies, 65 Tax L. Rev. 723 (2012).
77 The individual mandate has an affordability exemption. IRC § 5000A(e)(1). But "af-
fordability" is determined after accounting for the subsidy provided by the premium tax
credits. IRC § 5000A(e)(1)(B)(ii). The premium tax credits thus play an important role in
supporting the policy goals of the individual mandate because without the premium tax
credits many low- and moderate-income taxpayers would be exempt from the mandate
because they would not have "affordable" insurance options.
78 Fully assessing the extent to which the Exchanges will be able to offer health insur-
ance products of comparable quality and cost to employer offerings is beyond the scope of
this Article. I hope to return to this question in future work.
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B. The ACA's Modifications to the Tax Exclusions and Creation
of Exchange Subsidies
The ACA will mostly leave the tax benefits for employer-provided
health insurance intact. 79 Most importantly, the ACA retains both the
tax exclusion for employer-provided health insurance and the self-em-
ployed health insurance deduction. The primary way in which the
ACA will alter the tax favorability of employer-provided health insur-
ance is through the creation of premium tax credits to subsidize the
purchase of insurance policies from the Exchanges.
Before assessing the impact of the premium tax credits, though, it is
worth briefly discussing some of the changes the ACA will make to
the previously existing tax benefits for employer-provided health in-
surance. To address criticisms that the exclusion for employer-pro-
vided health insurance leads to overconsumption of health care
services, 80 the ACA includes an excise tax on "Cadillac" health
plans.8' The Cadillac tax will impose a 40% levy on employer-pro-
vided insurance policies that benefit from the tax exclusion and that
provide "excess benefit"-with "excess benefit" defined as an out-
come where the annual cost of a health insurance plan exceeds a spec-
ified threshold designed to be higher than the amount most
individuals and families pay for health insurance.8 2 The excise tax on
Cadillac health plans thus reduces the tax benefit that the exclusions
for employer-provided health insurance generate for high-cost health
plans.
The Cadillac excise tax is not scheduled to go into effect until
2018,3 however, and there is reason to doubt whether Congress and
the President8 4 will allow the provision to go into effect at that time.8 5
79 See Linda Blumberg, Matthew Buettgens, Judy Feder & John Holahan, Why Employ-
ers Will Continue to Provide Health Insurance: The Impact of the Affordable Care Act
(Urban Inst., 2011), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412428-The-Impact-
of-the-Affordable-Care-Act.pdf; The HR Specialist, Health Care Reform: Will Employers
Keep Offering Coverage?, Business Mgmt. Daily (May 10, 2011), http://www.business-
managementdaiiy.com/14501/health-care-reform-will-employers-keep-offering-coverage.
80 Id. at 5-6 ("This tax originated in the broad consensus that the Code's current tax
treatment of employer-provided medical care encourages overconsumption of medical
services.").
81 IRC § 49801.
82 IRC §49801 (a), (b); Amy B. Monahan, Why Tax High-Cost Employer Health Plans,
65 Tax L. Rev. 749 (2012).
83 IRC § 49801.
84 At the time of this writing, it remains to be seen who will be the President in the years
leading up to 2018.
85 See Zelinsky, note 4, at 8 ("Given the palpable reluctance of President Obama and
the members of the 111th Congress to force their constituents to confront the tax on 'Cad-
illac' plans any time soon, why should we expect a future President and the senators and
representatives of the 115th Congress to let this tax go into effect in 2018?").
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In addition, even if and when the Cadillac excise tax becomes active,
the tax will not affect employer-provided health insurance plans un-
less the plans both benefit from the tax exclusion and have costs that
exceed the excess-benefit threshold.8 6 Consequently, the exclusion
for employer-provided health insurance will continue to generate a
large tax-subsidy even after 2018.87
It is also noteworthy that, beginning in 2013, the ACA will raise the
itemized medical expenses deduction percentage threshold from 7.5%
to 10%.88 Otherwise, the changes that the ACA will make to the pre-
viously existing health care tax benefits are not of primary importance
for the purposes of this Article. 89
What will be of primary importance are the premium tax credits
that will be available starting in 2014.90 The premium tax credits will
defray the cost of health insurance for qualifying low- and middle-
income taxpayers purchasing health insurance from an Exchange. 91
The amounts by which the premium tax credits will defray the costs of
health insurance will depend on a taxpayer's household income as
compared to the federal poverty line, the cost of health insurance pre-
miums for the applicable benchmark plan, and the number of eligible
members in the taxpayer's coverage family.92 As a baseline, taxpayers
whose household incomes are less than 133% of the federal poverty
line will be expected to contribute no more than 2% of their house-
hold incomes toward health insurance; 93 taxpayers whose household
incomes are between 300% and 400% of the federal poverty line will
be expected to contribute no more than 9.5% of their household in-
comes toward health insurance; and taxpayers whose household in-
comes are between these levels will be expected to contribute
maximum amounts of between 2% and 9.5% of their household in-
86 The excess benefit threshold is defined in IRC § 49801(b)(3)(C).
87 See Shubham Singhal, Jeris Stueland & Drew Ungerman, How US Health Care Re-
form Will Affect Employee Benefits, McKinsey Q. (June, 2011), www.mckinseyquarterly.
com/How_US_healthcarereform will-affectemployeebenefits_2813.
88 IRC § 213(a). Through 2016, a taxpayer of age of sixty-five or older can use the prior
threshold of 7.5%. IRC § 213(f).
89 For instance, the ACA makes a number of minor changes to the rules governing
HSAs, MSAs, HRAs, and FSAs. See Zelinsky, note 4, at 10-11.
90 IRC § 36B.
91 More specifically, taxpayers must have household income for the taxable year of be-
tween 100% and 400% of the federal poverty line for the taxpayer's family size in order to
be eligible for the premium tax credits. Prop. Reg. § 1.36B-2, 76 Fed. Reg. 50931, 50940
(Aug. 17, 2011).
92 For a more detailed description of credit computation, see Prop. Reg. § 36B, 76 Fed.
Reg. 50931, 50933-34 (Aug. 17, 2011).
93 Note that most taxpayers whose household incomes are below 133% of the federal
poverty line should be eligible for Medicaid and not the premium tax credits.
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comes, on a sliding scale. 94 Taxpayers whose household incomes are
above 400% of the federal poverty line will not be eligible for the
premium tax credits.95
As a supplement to the premium tax credits, taxpayers purchasing
insurance from an Exchange may also be eligible for cost-sharing sub-
sidies.96 The cost-sharing subsidies will reduce taxpayers' out-of-
pocket costs for deductibles, coinsurance, copayments, and similar
amounts that otherwise would be charged to them by their health in-
surance plans. Like the premium tax credits, the value of the cost-
sharing subsidies a taxpayer will be eligible for depends on the tax-
payer's household income as a percent of the federal poverty line. 97
To understand the value provided by the premium tax credits and
cost sharing subsidies, the following chart, adapted from a study by
the Tax Policy Center, estimates the total federal subsidies a family of
four would be eligible for in 2016 for health insurance purchased from
an Exchange (that is, the value of the "Exchange subsidies"): 98
TABLE 1
Estimated Value of Exchange Health Insurance Subsidies
(Family of four, 2016)
Household
Income: Cash
Compensation
Amounts
$24,000
30,000
36,000
42,000
48,000
54,000
60,000
66,000
72,000
78,000
84,000
90,000
96,000
102,000
108,000
Value of
Premium Tax
Credits
Received
$13,598
13,473
12,595
11,738
10,940
9,869
9,053
7,776
6,952
6,468
5,761
5,165
4,570
Value of Cost
Sharing
Subsidies
Received
$4,834
4,834
3,021
3,021
604
604
Total Value of
Exchange
Subsidies
$18,432
18,307
15,616
14,759
11,544
10,473
9,053
7,776
6,952
6,468
5,761
5,165
4,570
94 IRC § 36B(b)(3)(A)(i). These percentage amounts may be indexed for inflation or
excess premium growth. IRC § 36B(b)(3)(A)(ii).
95 IRC § 36B(c)(1)(A).
96 42 U.S.C. § 18071.
97 Id.
98 Stephanie Rennane & C. Eugene Steuerle, Health Reform: A Two-Subsidy System,
at *3 tbl.3 (Tax Pol'y Ctr., 2010), available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/library/
displayatab.cfm?Docid=2699.
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Household
Income as a
% of FPL
100
125
150
175
200
225
250
275
300
325
350
375
400
425
450
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As the chart demonstrates, low- and moderate-income families
who purchase health insurance from an Exchange may be eligible for
subsidies worth many thousands of dollars annually. However, these
Exchange subsidies will not be available to taxpayers who have the
option of purchasing affordable employer-sponsored health insur-
ance.99 An employer who offers employees the option of purchasing
affordable health insurance may thus make those employees ineligible
for the Exchange subsidies, regardless of whether the employees actu-
ally enroll in the employer-sponsored health insurance. 100 An offer of
employer-sponsored health insurance will be considered "affordable"
for purposes of a taxpayer's eligibility for the Exchange subsidies if
the amount the taxpayer would have to contribute to pay for the in-
surance premiums does not exceed 9.5% of the taxpayer's household
income.' 0'
Crucially, an offer of affordable employer-sponsored health insur-
ance will result in an employee's entire family being ineligible for the
Exchange subsidies, not just the employee.10 2 Moreover, under Trea-
sury's proposed regulations, whether an employer's offer of family
coverage is considered affordable is determined based on the cost the
employee would need to contribute for self-only coverage. 10 3 In other
words, if an employer offers an insurance policy with an option for
family coverage, and if the amount an employee would need to con-
tribute to pay for the portion of the policy covering only the employee
(and not also the other members of the employee's family) is less than
9.5% of the employee's household income, then the employee's entire
family will be ineligible for the Exchange subsidies.
99 IRC § 36B(c)(2)(B),(C); Prop. Reg. § 1.36B-2(c)(3), 76 Fed. Reg. 50941, 50935 (Aug.
17, 2011). Taxpayers eligible for health insurance from other government programs will
also generally be ineligible for the premium tax credits. IRC § 36B(c)(2)(B); Prop. Reg.
§ 1.36B-2(c), 76 Fed. Reg. 50931, 50940-42 (Aug. 17, 2011).
It is unclear the extent to which these rules will apply to the cost-sharing subsidies in
addition to the premium tax credits. Yet, as a practical matter, very few (if any) taxpayers
will receive the cost-sharing subsidies without also receiving the premium tax credits.
Hence, I discuss the implications of these rules for the combined "Exchange subsidies"
rather than for just the premium tax credits.
100 For an employer's offer of health insurance to disqualify employees from receiving
the premium tax credits, the offered health insurance must be both affordable and provide
"minimum value." IRC § 36B(c)(2)(C). A full discussion of the minimum value rule is
beyond the scope of this Article, but it is worth noting that the purpose of the minimum
value rule is to insure that employer-provided insurance must have some real content in
order to protect the employer from the employer-mandate penalties of § 4980H and in
order to disqualify employees from receiving the premium tax credits.
101 IRC § 36B(c)(2)(C)(i)(II); Prop. Reg. § 1.36B-2(c)(3)(v)(B), 76 Fed. Reg. 50931,
50941-42 (Aug. 17, 2011).
102 IRC § 36B(c)(2)(C)(i); Prop. Reg. § 1.36B-3(b)(2), 76 Fed. Reg. 50931, 50943 (Aug.
17, 2011).
103 Prop. Reg. § 1.36B-2(c)(3)(v)(A)(1), 76 Fed. Reg. 50931, 50935 (Aug. 17, 2011).
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The policy rationale for basing the affordability of family coverage
on the cost of self-only coverage for the employee is (of course) the
goal of federal budgetary savings. 10 4 I elaborate on this policy deci-
sion below. 10 5 For now, it is important to understand that an em-
ployer who offers an option to purchase family coverage, and who
offers self-only coverage costing less than 9.5% of an employee's
household income, thereby makes the employee's family members in-
eligible for the Exchange subsidies-regardless of the cost of the fam-
ily coverage.
In effect, then, the ACA makes employers choose between offering
their employees either the benefits of the tax exclusions or the Ex-
change subsidies. An employee must enroll in employer-sponsored
health insurance in order to receive the tax exclusions, but enrolling in
employer-sponsored health insurance makes the employee ineligible
for the Exchange subsidies.10 6 Moreover, employers cannot simply
leave the choice of whether to take advantage of the tax exclusions or
the Exchange subsidies to their individual employees, as even offering
an employee the option of affordable employer-provided health insur-
ance makes the employee ineligible for the Exchange subsidies.10 7
This dynamic is significant because whereas the Exchange subsidies
are more valuable for lower-income taxpayers, the tax exclusions are
more valuable for higher-income taxpayers. 10 8 Comparing just the
Exchange subsidies' 0 9 to the tax exclusions"0 based on the Tax Policy
Center's estimates for 2016,111 the break-even point for an individual
104 See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, Health Reform's $50 Billion Question: What's 'Affordable'?,
Blog Post, Ezra Klein's Wonkblog (Aug. 16, 2011, 11:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/health-reforms-50-billion-question-whatsaffordabe/2011/08/2/
gIQAJijEJJ blog.html (quoting Tim Jost as saying "I don't think they want the headlines
that it was going to cost $50 billion more .... ").
105 See notes 147-176 [X] and accompanying text.
106 IRC § 36B(c)(2)(C)(iii).
107 IRC § 36B(c)(2)(B)-(C). More precisely, in order to offer employees the choice of
whether to take advantage of the Exchange subsidies or the tax exclusions, an employer
must offer employer-sponsored health insurance that is unaffordable to the employee (or,
alternatively, that does not offer minimum value). By combining an offer of unaffordable
health insurance with a cafeteria plan, an employer could effectively grant at least some
employees the option of whether to take advantage of the tax exclusions or the Exchange
subsidies. Moreover, for employers who currently subsidize their sponsored insurance of-
ferings, replacing those subsidies with increased cash wages could make the employer-
sponsored insurance policies unaffordable to a wider group of employees, potentially in-
creasing both employer and employee welfare at the expense of the federal government.
108 See Rennane & Steuerle, note 98, at tbl.4 (comparing the value of the Exchange
subsidies and tax exclusions for different household income levels).
109 By "Exchanges subsidies" I mean both the premium tax credits and the cost-sharing
subsidies.
110 By "tax exclusions" I mean both the income tax exclusion and the payroll tax exclu-
sion for employer-provided health insurance.
111 See note 108.
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might be when household income is somewhere between 350% and
375% of the federal poverty line.112 And the break-even point for a
family of four might be when household income reaches 400% of the
federal poverty line." 3 For household incomes below these break-
even points, the Exchange subsidies will generally offer more value
than the tax exclusions. Conversely, for household incomes above
these break-even points, the tax exclusions will generally offer more
value than the Exchange subsidies.
These break-even analyses assume that the health insurance policies
offered on the Exchanges will be of equivalent cost and quality as
compared to employer-sponsored health insurance policies. If all of
the available Exchange coverage options end up being inferior to em-
ployer-sponsored health insurance options, then the break-even
thresholds would need to be adjusted accordingly.11 4 For simplicity, in
this Article, I mostly follow the Tax Policy Center's approach and as-
sume that Exchange health insurance and employer-provided health
insurance will be of equivalent cost and value after the relevant provi-
sions of the ACA come into effect in 2014.115
These break-even analyses also assume that employers offer their
employees subsidized health insurance as a form of employee com-
pensation, 116 an assumption that underlies virtually all economic stud-
ies of health care provision.117 When comparing the premiums they
must pay for Exchange coverage against the premiums they must pay
for employer-sponsored coverage, many employees will prefer em-
ployer-sponsored coverage to the extent that employers continue to
subsidize this coverage. But in the long run, these employer subsidies
come out of the amounts paid as wages to employees. 1 8 As such,
112 This break-even threshold is calculated from Table 3 in Section III.C. The calcula-
tion subtracts the § 4980H employer penalty from the net benefit of Exchange coverage, to
obtain the relative value of the Exchange subsidies as compared to the tax exclusions for
individuals of different incomes.
113 This break-even threshold is calculated from Table 2 in Section III.C. As above, the
calculation subtracts the § 4980H employer penalty from the net benefit of Exchange
coverage.
114 Note that there will be a variety of insurance policies offered on the Exchanges, with
different trade-offs between premium costs and generosity of benefits.
115 See Rennane & Steuerle, note 98, at tbl.1, tbl.3.
116 See notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
117 See, e.g., Devon Herrick, Health Exchange Subsidies Will Reduce Employer Health
Plans *2 (Nat'l Ctr. for Pol'y Analysis, 2011) (2011), available at http://www.ncpa.org/pub/
ba758 ("Economists generally agree employee benefits are a dollar-for-dollar substitute for
wages."); Katherine Pratt, Funding Health Care with an Employer Mandate: Efficiency
and Equity Concerns, 39 St. Louis U. L.J. 155, 160-61 (1994) ("Economists agree that em-
ployees ultimately bear the economic burden of employer-provided health care benefits, in
the form of lower wages.").
118 Pratt, note 117, at 160-61.
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these employer subsidies should be factored out when evaluating the
effective taxes facing employees.
Hence, were the tax exclusions and the Exchange subsidies the only
relevant factors, employers would face incentives to offer affordable
health insurance only to their higher-income employees-to those em-
ployees whose household incomes are above the relevant break-even
thresholds. Both lower-income employees and their employers would
jointly benefit from the employers not offering the lower-income em-
ployees affordable health insurance. Employers who would have sub-
sidized health insurance for their lower-income employees, were it not
for the Exchange subsidies, could provide better value for those em-
ployees by instead using the amounts of the subsidies to increase the
lower-income employees' cash wages.
C. The ACA's New Employer-Mandate Penalties and
Nondiscrimination Rules
Beyond the tax exclusions and Exchange subsidies, the ACA con-
tains other provisions that will significantly affect employers' incen-
tives as to whether to offer health insurance. In drafting the ACA, the
Obama Administration and the Democratic majority in Congress
were very concerned about whether employers would stop offering
health insurance after the ACA came into effect. The Administration
campaigned for the ACA by telling the public that anyone who liked
their existing insurance coverage would be able to keep it.n 9 The Ad-
ministration also campaigned for the ACA based on budget estimates
that the ACA would reduce the deficit. 120 Maintaining the previous
119 See David A. Hyman, Employment-Based Health Insurance: Insurance: Is Health
Reform a "Game Changer?" 1 N.Y.U. Rev. Emp. Benefits & Executive Compensation
lA-1, 1A-11 to -12 (2010) ("During the 2008 campaign, (then Senator) Obama routinely
promised 'if you like your coverage you can keep it.' Even ABC News thought the prom-
ise was 'not literally true,' but Senator Obama had found a winning slogan, and he stuck to
it. President Obama repeated and expanded this claim during the battle over health re-
form, flatly claiming in a speech to the AMA that, 'no matter how we reform health care,
we will keep this promise: If you like your doctor, you will be able to keep your doctor.
Period. If you like your health care plan, you will be able to keep your health care plan.
Period. No one will take it away. No matter what."'); Robert Pear & David M. Her-
szenhorn, As Bombast Escalates, a Primer on the Details of Health Care Overhaul, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 10, 2009, at A8.
120 See David Hyman, PPACA in Theory and Practice: The Perils of Parallelism, 97 Va.
L. Rev. In Brief 83 (2011), http://virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2011/11/04/human.pdf
("PPACA would not have passed unless it was deemed to be 'affordable'-which in Wash-
ington meant that it had to be scored by the Congressional Budget Office ... as costing less
than $1 trillion over the ten year budgetary window. The task of selling PPACA to a skep-
tical public would also be substantially easier if it could somehow be scored by the CBO as
deficit reducing (at least over the same budgetary window) .... [T]he Administration and
Congress hit both of these targets by completely gaming the CBO scoring process."); Ezra
Klein, OMB, ACA, CBO and the Deficit, Ezra Klein: Economic and Domestic Policy, and
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system of employer-sponsored coverage for lower-income taxpayers
was considered important for realizing the ACA's deficit-reducing po-
tential because additional lower-income employees qualifying for the
Exchange subsidies would drive up the budgetary cost of the Ex-
change subsidies.
The ACA was thus drafted to include additional provisions incen-
tivizing employers to maintain employer-sponsored health insurance
even for their lower-income employees. The two most important of
these provisions are the employer-mandate penalties121 and the new
nondiscrimination rules. 122
The employer-mandate penalties will apply to "applicable large em-
ployers" beginning in 2014.123 With a few exceptions, 124 employers
who employ at least fifty full-time employees for more than 120 days
during a calendar year will be considered applicable large employers
potentially subject to the § 4980H penalties. 125
Section 4980H includes two separate employer-mandate penalties.
The § 4980H(a) penalty applies when an applicable large employer
"fails to offer to its full-time employees (and their dependents) the
opportunity to enroll" in qualifying employer-sponsored health cover-
age.126 For any month in which it is triggered, the § 4980H(a) penalty
will equal one-twelfth of $2000 multiplied by the total number of full-
time employees employed during the month. The penalty is thus not
tailored to the number of employees to whom an employer does not
offer health insurance. Instead, this penalty will be assessed based on
an employer's total number of full-time employees, even if the em-
ployer provides health insurance to all but a small percentage of those
employees. 127
Lots of It (July 8, 2010, 5:55 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/07/
omb aca cbo and the deficit.htmi.
121 IRC § 4980H.
122 PPACA, § 1001, 124 Stat. at 884 (amending § 2716 of the Public Health Service Act,
Pub. L. No. 78-410, 58 Stat. 682 (1944)).
123 IRC § 4980H; Notice 2011-73, 2011-2 C.B. 474.
124 E.g., IRC § 4980H(c)(2)(B)(i)(II).
125 IRC § 4980H(c)(2). Whereas applicable large employers are incentivized to offer
health insurance through the § 4980H penalties, small employers are incentivized to offer
health insurance through tax credits offered by new § 45R. I do not discuss the small-
employer health insurance tax credits, as they are less important for the purposes of this
Article. For a discussion of these credits, see Zelinsky, note 4, at 14-17.
126 IRC § 4980H(a)(1).
127 More precisely, the § 4980H(a) penalty is assessed based on the number of full-time
employees excluding the first thirty employees. IRC § 4980H(c)(2)(D)(i). In a Request
for Comments on § 4980H, Treasury hints that § 4980H may be interpreted to require only
that an employer offer coverage to "substantially all" of its full-time employees. No fur-
ther clarification is given as to what is meant by "substantially all." See Notice 2011-36,
2011-1 C.B. 792 ("It is contemplated that the proposed regulations would make clear that
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The § 4980H(a) penalty will thus interfere with the strategy of an
employer providing health insurance only to higher-income employ-
ees and sending lower-income employees to the Exchanges. Yet the
penalty will not prevent a variation of this strategy, as the penalty will
only be triggered if an employer fails to offer health insurance. An
employer will thus be able to avoid this penalty by offering health
insurance to all full-time employees regardless of how much the em-
ployees would be charged for that insurance. Therefore, an employer
could offer very expensive insurance to lower-income employees in
order to avoid the penalty while still allowing those employees to
qualify for the premium tax credits. As long as the lower-income em-
ployees' required contributions for the health insurance would exceed
9.5% of the employees' household incomes, the insurance would be
considered "unaffordable"-making the employees eligible for the
Exchange subsidies.
In contrast to the § 4980H(a) penalty, the § 4980H(b) penalty will
be triggered when an employer does offer health insurance, but when
that insurance is deemed "unaffordable.' 1 28 Also unlike the
§ 4980H(a) penalty, the § 4980H(b) penalty is tailored to the actual
number of employees who qualify for the Exchange subsidies (be-
cause the employer's offer of health insurance was unaffordable),
rather than being based on the total number of employees. 129 More
specifically, for any month in which it is triggered, the penalty will
equal one-twelfth of $3000 multiplied by the number of full-time em-
ployees that receive the Exchange subsidies because the insurance of-
fered to them by their employer was unaffordable. 130 The amount of
the § 4980H(b) penalty will be limited, however, so that it can never
exceed the amount that the employer would have been liable for had
the § 4980H(a) penalty been triggered instead. Consequently, for any
month, the § 4980H(b) penalty is limited to a maximum of one-twelfth
of $2000 multiplied by the total number of full-time employees em-
ployed during the month. 131
The § 4980H(b) penalty will thus raise the cost to an employer of
not offering affordable health insurance to lower-income employees
so that those employees can qualify for the Exchange subsidies. The
amount by which the § 4980H(b) penalty will raise the costs of this
an employee offering coverage to all, or substantially all, of its full-time employees would
not be subject to the § 4980H(a) assessable payment provisions.").
128 The § 4980H(b) penalty may also be triggered by offers of affordable health insur-
ance that fail the minimum value test of § 36B(c)(2)(C)(ii).
129 IRC § 4980H(b)(1).
130 Id.
131 IRC § 4980H(b)(2). More precisely, the penalty is assessed based on the number of
full-time employees excluding the first thirty employees.
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
[Vol. 65:
TAX PROVISIONS OF HEALTHCARE REFORM
strategy depends on the percentage of an employer's workforce that
ends up qualifying for the Exchange subsidies. An employer with
only a small percentage of low- and moderate-income employees
might face the full § 4980H(b) penalty of $3000 annually per em-
ployee that qualifies for the Exchange subsidies. In contrast, an em-
ployer with a large percentage of low- and moderate-income
employees might have the § 4980H(b) assessable payments limited to
the § 4980H(a) penalty amount of $2000 annually multiplied by the
total number of full-time employees.
The following charts, again adapted from a study by the Tax Policy
Center, 132 demonstrate the relative costs to employers of either offer-
ing employer-sponsored health insurance or sending employees to the
Exchanges in 2016. The analysis incorporates the value of the Ex-
change subsidies, the tax exclusions, and the § 4980H employer-man-
date penalties. The analysis uses the § 4980H(a) penalty amounts of
$2000 per employee annually, adjusted for inflation. The § 4980H em-
ployer-mandate penalties would be higher, making the break-even
thresholds lower, for employers with only a small percentage of lower-
income employees who would thus be subject to the § 4980H(b) pen-
alty of up to $3000 annually per employee qualifying for the Exchange
subsidies. The first chart shows the break-even analysis for an em-
ployee with four members in the employee's household and the sec-
ond chart shows the break-even analysis for an individual employee.
For both charts, the right-most column ("Net Benefit of Exchange
Coverage") shows the total additional value that could be received
from an employer not offering affordable health insurance so that an
employee can qualify for the Exchange subsidies. This "Net Benefit
of Exchange Coverage" is equal to the value of the Exchange subsi-
dies minus both the additional taxes that would be paid (for example,
from not taking advantage of the tax exclusions) and the employer-
mandate penalty.
132 Rennane & Steuerle, note 98, at tbl.2, tbl.4. Note that the Tax Policy Center's analy-
sis underlying these charts is based on holding employers' costs constant. I do not explain
the Tax Policy Center's methodology here, as interested readers can find that explanation
in the Tax Policy Center's report. Id.
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TABLE 2
Break-Even Analysis for an Employee Receiving Exchange Coverage
(Family of four, 2016)
Household
Income: Cash
Compensation
Amounts
$24,000
30,000
36,000
42,000
48,000
54,000
60,000
66,000
72,000
78,000
84,000
90,000
96,000
102,000
108,000
Total
Value of
Exchange
Subsidies
$18,433
18,307
15,617
14,759
11,544
10,473
9,053
7,776
6,952
6,468
5,761
5,165
4,570
Total
Increase in
Taxes Paid
$ (124)
2,297
4,568
5,536
5,456
4,493
3,544
3,544
3,544
3,544
3,544
3,544
3,544
3,544
4,134
Section
4980H
Employer
Penalty
$2,247
2,247
2,247
2,247
2,247
2,247
2,247
2,247
2,247
2,247
2,247
2,247
2,247
2,247
2,247
Net Benefit
of
Exchange
Coverage
$16,309
13,763
8,801
6,976
3,840
3,733
3,261
1,984
1,160
676
(31)
(627)
(1,222)
(5,792)
(6,382)
TABLE 3
Break-Even Analysis for an Employee Receiving Exchange Coverage
(Individual, 2016)
Household
Income: Cash
Compensation
Amounts
$11,800
14,700
17,700
20,600
23,600
26,500
29,500
32,400
35,400
38,300
41,300
44,200
47,200
50,100
53,100
Total
Value of
Exchange
Subsidies
$6,736
6,676
5,574
5,156
3,869
3,347
2,718
2,095
1,686
1,452
1,100
812
514
Total
Increase in
Taxes Paid
$ 866
1,142
913
901
1,040
1,040
1,040
1,040
1,040
1,040
1,040
1,040
1,050
1,340
1,453
Section
4980H
Employer
Penalty
$2,247
2,247
2,247
2,247
2,247
2,247
2,247
2,247
2,247
2,247
2,247
2,247
2,247
2,247
2,247
Net Benefit
of
Exchange
Coverage
$3,623
3,286
2,414
2,008
582
60
(569)
(1,192)
(1,601)
(1,835)
(2,187)
(2,475)
(2,783)
(3,587)
(3,700)
As the charts demonstrate, the primary impact of the employer-
mandate penalties will be to lower the break-even thresholds for the
household-income levels at which employers and employees would
jointly benefit from the employer not offering affordable health insur-
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
Employee's
Household
Income as a
% of FPL
100
125
150
175
200
225
250
275
300
325
350
375
400
425
450
Employee's
Household
Income as a
% of FPL
100
125
150
175
200
225
250
275
300
325
350
375
400
425
450
TAX PROVISIONS OF HEALTHCARE REFORM
ance so that the employee can qualify for the Exchange subsidies.
Nevertheless, many low- and moderate-income employees will still
benefit more from receiving the Exchange subsidies than from receiv-
ing employer-sponsored health insurance. For a family of four in
2016, the break-even threshold for the household-income level at
which it will be more cost effective for an employer to not offer af-
fordable health insurance might be somewhere between 325% and
350% of the federal poverty line. For an individual employee, the
break-even threshold might be somewhere between 225% and 250%
of the federal poverty line. The numerous employees with household
incomes below the relevant break-even thresholds would benefit more
from their employers not offering affordable health insurance and
paying the employer-mandate penalties so that the employees can
qualify for the premium tax credits.
To recap, the § 4980H(a) penalty will not prevent employers from
providing health insurance to their higher-income employees while
sending their lower-income employees to the Exchanges, because the
employers can avoid the § 4980H(a) penalty by offering their lower-
income employees unaffordable health insurance. Only the
§ 4980H(b) penalties will apply to an employer who offers unafford-
able health insurance to its lower-income employees. Consequently,
the primary effect of the § 4980H employer-mandate penalties will be
to lower the break-even thresholds by raising the cost of not offering
lower-income employees affordable health insurance by an amount
equal to the § 4980H(b) penalties.
Of course, employers will not be able to perfectly separate their
lower-income employees (whose household incomes fall below the
break-even thresholds) from their higher-income employees (whose
household incomes are above the break-even thresholds). Employers
will not always know their employees' household incomes, as house-
hold income may derive from sources other than from the em-
ployer.133 Additionally, employers may find it difficult to vary the
cost of the health insurance they offer to match the break-even thresh-
olds for employees with different family sizes. Nevertheless, the
133 Nevertheless, by setting the employee's cost of health insurance equal to the break-
even threshold based solely on the amount the employer pays to the employee, the em-
ployer can effectively enable nearly all employees with household incomes below the
break-even threshold to qualify for the Exchange subsidies. Employees whose household
incomes are higher than the amount paid by the employer to the employee, for instance,
employees with working spouses, can simply opt for the employer-sponsored insurance.
For employees whose household incomes are lower than the amount paid by the employer
to the employee, for instance, employees with significant tax losses not arising from their
employment, the Treasury Department and the IRS have announced their intention to
create an affordability safe harbor with respect to the § 4980H(b) employer penalties. See
IRS Notice 2011-73, note 123.
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§ 4980H employer-mandate penalties will not prevent employers from
exploiting the mismatch in available health care subsidies by simulta-
neously allowing many of their lower-income employees to qualify for
the Exchange subsidies and many of their higher-income employees to
benefit from the tax exclusions.
In contrast to the § 4980H employer-mandate penalties, the new
nondiscrimination rules could possibly be interpreted so as to prevent
employers from offering health insurance to their higher-income em-
ployees while allowing their lower-income employees to qualify for
the Exchange subsidies. The statutory language of the new nondis-
crimination rules is relatively short. In full, it reads:134
SEC. 2716. PROHIBITION ON DISCRIMINATION IN
FAVOR OF HIGHLY COMPENSATED INDIVIDUALS.
(a) IN GENERAL.-A group health plan (other than a
self-insured plan) shall satisfy the requirements of section
105(h)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to
prohibition on discrimination in favor of highly compensated
individuals).
(b) RULES AND DEFINITIONS.-For purposes of this
section-
(1) CERTAIN RULES TO APPLY.-Rules similar to
the rules contained in paragraphs (3), (4), and (8) of section
105(h) of such Code shall apply.
(2) HIGHLY COMPENSATED INDIVIDUAL.-The
term 'highly compensated individual' has the meaning given
such term by section 105(h)(5) of such Code.
Section 105(h) provides that self-funded health insurance plans can-
not discriminate in favor of highly compensated individuals either
with respect to eligibility to participate or with respect to the benefits
provided under the plan.135 The ACA's new nondiscrimination provi-
sions thus create rules for insured plans "similar to" those that previ-
ously existed for self-insured plans.136
134 42 U.S.C. 300gg-16; Notice 2010-63, 2010-2 C.B. 420.
135 IRC § 105(h)(2).
136 Section 2716 only applies to insured plans that are not grandfathered, although most
plans eventually will be covered. Shearman & Sterling, Post-Employment Medical Bene-
fits for Executives After Health Care Reform *2 (2010), available at http://www.shearman.
com/files/Publication/2f843bcc-ac8O-49c2-8bed-7d4f5Oded8b9/Presentation/PublicationAt-
tachment/9f41c894-d516-480f-91el-3a4b2286db95/ECEB-122110-Executive-Medical-Cov-
erage-After-Health-Reform.pdf. ("[I]t is anticipated that plan sponsors will find it difficult
to maintain the grandfathered status of their plans. Therefore, as a practical matter, most,
if not all, insured plans will eventually be subject to the new discrimination rule.").
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Prior to the ACA, the § 105(h) nondiscrimination rules were only
minimally enforced as employers were rarely audited for compliance
with these rules. 137 Recognizing that further guidance will be needed
to clarify the new § 2716 nondiscrimination rules, Treasury and the
IRS, along with the Department of Labor and HHS, "have deter-
mined that compliance with § 2716 should not be required (and thus,
any sanctions for failure to comply do not apply) until after regula-
tions or other administrative guidance of general applicability has
been issued under § 2716."138
Because such guidance has yet to be issued, I cannot at this time
fully assess how the new nondiscrimination might function in practice.
For now, it is an open question as to whether or to what extent the
new nondiscrimination rules might prevent employers from designing
their health insurance offerings so that higher-income employees can
take advantage of the tax exclusions while lower-income employees
can qualify for the Exchange subsidies because they are only offered
unaffordable health insurance. The new nondiscrimination rules may
interfere with this strategy, at least to some extent, but employers may
also find ways to effectuate this strategy while complying with the
nondiscrimination rules.
Consider the employer strategy of simply passing on to employees
the employer's costs for providing self-only coverage. Instead of sub-
sidizing employees' health insurance purchases, employers embracing
this strategy would switch any funds previously used to subsidize self-
only coverage to instead increase employees' cash wages. By also set-
ting up a cafeteria plan through which employees could opt to have
their take-home cash wages reduced in order to pay for health insur-
ance on a pre-tax basis, employers embracing this strategy could effec-
tively give employees the option of either continuing to use the
subsidy amounts to reduce the cost of employer-provided health in-
surance (now channeled through a cafeteria plan) or else taking the
subsidy amounts as higher cash salaries (that could be used to pay for
Exchange coverage).
According to a report by the Kaiser Family Foundation, in 2011, the
average cost of providing self-only coverage though employer-spon-
sored plans was $5,615 annually per employee. 139 This amount is pre-
137 See id. at *1 ("How the discrimination rules under § 105(h)(2) apply to medical plans
has never been completely clear. However, many employers did not have to confront the
ambiguities in the health plan discrimination rules under § 105(h)(2) because the rules
applied only to self-insured arrangements and the rules were rarely enforced or ruled upon
by the Internal Revenue Service.").
138 Notice 2011-1, 2011-1 C.B. 259.
139 The Kaiser Family Found. & Health Res. and Educational Trust, Employer Health
Benefits, 2012 Annual Survey 13, available at http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2012/8345.pdf.
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dicted to grow significantly faster than inflation and economic growth
over time. 140 Of this amount, employees paid for 18% of these costs
directly and employers paid for the remaining 72% through subsi-
dies.141 If an employer passed on to its employees the entire average
cost of self-only coverage ($5,615 in 2011), the employees would thus
not be considered to have an offer of affordable employer-sponsored
health insurance unless an employee's household income exceeded
$59,100 annually ($5,615/.095), adjusted for rising health care costs.
Hence, this strategy would allow most single employees, and many
employees with families, whose household income levels were below
the break-even thresholds to qualify for the Exchange subsidies. 142
Would this strategy violate the new nondiscrimination rules? I ex-
pect not. An employer embracing this strategy could offer insurance
to all employees on exactly the same terms. To prevent this strategy
then, the new nondiscrimination rules would need to be interpreted so
as to apply even when employers offered all employees insurance on
the same terms but when lower-income employees made different
choices than higher-income employees. Interpreting the nondiscrimi-
nation rules in this fashion could create very large costs for employers,
potentially affecting many employers who were not attempting to
game around the nondiscrimination rules but whose employees never-
theless made different choices with respect to insurance offerings
based on income. Although a full analysis of the impact of the new
nondiscrimination rules must wait until the release of guidance inter-
preting these rules, there is thus reason to expect that the new nondis-
crimination rules will not be interpreted so as to prevent employers
from providing health insurance to their higher-income employees
while sending many of their lower-income employees to the
Exchanges. 143
140 Nat'l Inst. for Health Care Management, Understanding U.S. Health Care Spending
1-8 (July 2011).
141 Kaiser Family Found, note 139, at 76.
142 To precisely calculate how this strategy would work with respect to the break-even
thresholds, we would need to adjust for the expected increases in the cost of employer-
sponsored health insurance after 2011 and for the higher household incomes the employees
would have on account of their employer switching from subsidizing the cost of health
insurance to increasing the employees' salaries. Nevertheless, the example above should
suffice to demonstrate that, by passing on the cost of health insurance to employees, an
employer can facilitate many lower income employees qualifying for the Exchange subsi-
dies while allowing higher income employees to continue to opt for employer-sponsored
health insurance.
143 Moreover, the strategy described above is only one technique employers might use
to enable their lower-income employees to qualify for the Exchange subsidies while main-
taining the benefits of the tax exclusions for their higher income employees. For instance,
employers might alternatively purposefully design insurance offerings that fail the mini-
mum value rules of § 36B(c)(2)(C)(ii).
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IV. How THE ACA WILL CREATE EFFECTIVE TAXES
The previous two Parts explained how the ACA will alter employ-
ers' incentives as to whether to offer health insurance. Crucially, the
ACA will create a mismatch between the tax subsidies available for
Exchange coverage and those available for employer-sponsored cov-
erage, such that most lower-income taxpayers would receive more tax
benefit from Exchange coverage whereas most higher-income taxpay-
ers would receive more tax benefit from employer-sponsored cover-
age. By creating this mismatch in the available tax subsidies, and then
attempting to nevertheless incentivize employers to offer affordable
health insurance even for their lower-income employees, the ACA
will impose significant and costly effective taxes with respect to low-
and moderate-income workers.
The effective taxes that the ACA will impose with respect to low-
and moderate-income workers can be grouped into two categories:
(1) effective taxes created by the design of the Exchange subsidies,
and (2) effective taxes created by the employer penalties. While there
is considerable overlap between these two categories of effective
taxes, it is nevertheless useful to consider the categories one at a time.
A. The Effective Taxes Created by the Design
of the Exchange Subsidies
From an efficiency perspective, the impact of a tax is determined by
the extent to which the tax alters the relevant prices of economic deci-
sions.144 When a law raises the cost of one economic choice relative to
alternative choices, this can be viewed as an effective tax on the choice
that is made more expensive. 145 The way in which the ACA structures
its Exchange subsidies will create effective taxes with respect to at
least three important decisions: the choice to work for employers of-
144 For an explanation of how taxes impose efficiency costs-or, alternatively, excess
burden or deadweight loss-see David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax
Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 Tax L. Rev. 19, 61-65 (2011).
145 Sometimes the term "effective tax" is used more narrowly. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker,
Effective Tax Rates: Fact or Fancy?, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 780, 781 (1974) ("When the tax-
payer's actual income tax liability is expressed as a fraction of a base other than taxable
income, the resulting percentage is usually described as the 'effective rate.'"). But the
term "effective taxes" can also be used broadly, as in this Article. See, e.g., Daniel
Shaviro, Effective Marginal Tax Rates on Low-Income Households, 84 Tax Notes 1191,
1192 (Aug. 23, 1999) ("My focus on effective marginal tax rates yields a very different
perspective .... the analysis cannot stop with provisions that are formally denominated
'taxes.' The reason one should care about marginal tax rates is that they show how govern-
ment policy is affecting incentives and the distributional consequences of people's deci-
sions. ... A marginal tax rate analysis thus must take account of all government programs
that are either directly or indirectly income-conditioned.").
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fering affordable health insurance, the choice to seek higher income,
and the choice to marry (or, equivalently, the choice not to divorce).
The effective taxes that the ACA will impose on the decision to
work for employers that offer affordable health insurance are proba-
bly among the most important of the effective taxes that this Article
analyzes. Most low- and moderate-income Americans would receive
considerably more value from the Exchange subsidies than from the
tax exclusions. Yet if employers offer affordable health insurance to
their low- and moderate-income workers, these workers will become
disqualified from receiving the Exchange subsidies. The ACA will
thus impose effective taxes on low- and moderate-income workers'
choice of whether to work for an employer offering affordable health
insurance equal to the degree to which the tax exclusions would offer
these workers less value than would the Exchange subsidies.146
For many low- and moderate-income workers, accepting a job with
an employer that offers affordable health insurance will result in a net
loss of thousands of dollars of health care subsidies.' 47 For instance, in
2016, a family of four with a household income of $60,000 would suf-
fer a net loss of approximately $5500 in health care subsidies from
being offered affordable employer-sponsored health coverage. 148 For
a family of four with a household income of $36,000, the net loss of
health care subsidies would be approximately $11,000-almost a third
of the family's household income.1 49 These effective taxes will
strongly deter low- and moderate-income taxpayers from accepting
jobs that offer affordable health insurance.1 50
146 As noted earlier, if Exchange coverage remains inferior to employer-sponsored cov-
erage even after the ACA, then the difference in value between the Exchange subsidies
and the tax exclusions must be discounted by the degree to which Exchange coverage of-
fers inferior value. See note 114 and accompanying text.
147 See note 132 and accompanying text.
148 These calculations are derived from the break-even charts based on the Tax Policy
Center's analysis. See Table 2, Section III.C. These calculations factor out the employer-
mandate penalties, because the goal here is to demonstrate the loss in health care subsidies
to an employee from being offered affordable employer-sponsored health insurance; the
goal is not to show break-even analyses or employers' incentives.
149 Id. This loss in health care subsidies would be mitigated for families able to qualify
for other government health care programs. Notably, although a family of four with
household income of $36,000 in 2016 should not qualify for Medicaid, as the family's in-
come would be too high, the children might still qualify for the Children's Health Insur-
ance Program (CHIP).
150 Of course, the actual magnitude of the effective taxes on accepting jobs that offer
affordable health insurance will depend on how much income the taxpayers could have
earned from their alternative choices-from not working for employers that offer afforda-
ble health insurance. A full calculation of effective taxes would need to incorporate the
many factors affecting the returns to work. The figures shown above are at best rough
approximates, but they should still suffice to illustrate that the net loss of health care subsi-
dies may be very large.
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As long as at least some employers offer jobs that do not provide
affordable employer-sponsored health insurance, low- and moderate-
income Americans can be expected to strongly prefer these jobs over
similar jobs that do offer affordable employer-sponsored health insur-
ance. And for taxpayers who are not committed to working in the
formal sector, the effective taxes that the ACA will impose on ac-
cepting a job that offers affordable health insurance may significantly
decrease the incentives to accept formal-sector employment.
In addition to these effective taxes, the ACA will create further ef-
fective taxes because the value of the Exchange subsidies will phase
out as household income increases. 151 For instance, in 2016, a family
of four without an offer of affordable employer-sponsored health in-
surance would lose approximately $6500 in Exchange subsidies from
increasing household income from $36,000 to $60,000.152 And for tax-
payers who move from lower-paying jobs that do not offer affordable
health insurance to higher-paying jobs that do offer affordable health
insurance, these two forms of effective taxes will stack.' 53 Returning
to our family of four in 2016, switching from earning a household in-
come of $36,000 without affordable employer-sponsored health insur-
ance to a household income of $60,000 with affordable employer-
sponsored health insurance would result in a net loss of approximately
$12,000 in health care subsidies. 154 Although this loss of health care
subsidies is less than the increased income paid by the new job, the
effective taxes created by the loss of health care subsidies can be ex-
pected to significantly decrease taxpayers' incentives to make sacri-
fices in order to obtain higher paying jobs.
The ACA's effective taxes on accepting jobs that offer affordable
health coverage may be especially problematic because they affect the
extensive margin of labor supply. The extensive margin of labor sup-
ply refers to the choice of whether or not to work; in contrast, the
151 Seth J. Chandler, The Architecture of Contemporary Healthcare Reform and Effec-
tive Marginal Tax Rates, 29 Miss. C. L. Rev. 335 (2010) (analyzing the effective taxes the
ACA will create by phasing out the Exchange subsidies as household income increases).
For a more general discussion of how phasing out social welfare benefits can generate high
effective marginal tax rates, see generally Shaviro, note 145.
152 See Table 2 in Section III.C. (subtracting the Total Value of Exchange Subsidies cor-
responding with a Household Income of $60,000 from the Total Value of Exchange Subsi-
dies corresponding with a Household Income of $36,000).
153 Moreover, these effective taxes created by the design of the Exchange subsidies will
further stack with the effective taxes created by the design of other social welfare programs
and with payroll taxes. See Chandler, note 151, at 361; Shaviro, note 145, at 1192.
154 See Table 2, Section III.C. (subtracting the Total Increases in Taxes Paid correspond-
ing with a Household Income of $60,000 from the Total Value of Exchange Subsidies corre-
sponding with a Household Income of $36,000).
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intensive margin refers to the choice of how many hours to work. 155
A strong finding of the empirical economics literature is that labor-
supply elasticities for low-income workers are much stronger along
the extensive margin than along the intensive margin. 156 Indeed, men
appear to be "almost completely irresponsive" to effective taxes along
the intensive margin, but "very responsive" to effective taxes along
the extensive margin. 157 Women are more responsive than men along
both margins; but like men, women are even more responsive along
the extensive margin than the intensive margin. 158 Consequently, an
effective tax operating on the extensive margin is far more likely to
affect labor-supply decisions-and thereby reduce economic effi-
ciency-than would a similarly sized tax affecting only the intensive
margin. 159
The ACA's denial of the Exchange subsidies to taxpayers with of-
fers of affordable employer-sponsored health insurance will create ef-
fective taxes along the extensive margin by reducing the net benefit
low-income taxpayers would receive from accepting a job with an em-
ployer offering affordable health insurance. 160 Moreover, there are
reasons to think that when low-income workers decide against ac-
cepting formal-sector jobs this can generate negative externalities.' 6'
As Nobel-Prize-winning economist Edmund Phelps has argued, when
low-income taxpayers decide against formal-sector work, this decision
can harm the taxpayers' children, the taxpayers' neighborhoods, and
155 See Emmanuel Saez, Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive Versus Exten-
sive Labor Supply Responses, 117 Q.J. Econ. 1039, 1039 (2002).
156 Id. at 1039-40.
157 Costas Meghir & David Phillips, Labour Supply and Taxes 44-45 (Inst. for Fisc. Stud.,
2008), available at http:ltwww.ifs.org.uk/mirrleesreview/reports/labour-supply.pdf.
158 Saez, note 155, at 1056.
159 For instance, a number of scholars have criticized the effective marginal taxes created
by the phase out of tax benefits like the earned income tax credit (EITC). E.g., Shaviro,
note 145, at 1194. The manner in which the EITC phases out, however, primarily affects
only the intensive margin, not the extensive margin, such that the EITC may phase out in a
close to optimal fashion. Saez, note 155, at 1064-65 ("The combined EITC and U.S. wel-
fare system for single mothers is close to our optimal simulated schedules if, as evidenced
by empirical studies, participation elasticities are substantial."). In contrast, both the man-
ner in which the Exchange subsidies phase out and the denial of the Exchange subsidies to
employees with offers of affordable employer-sponsored health insurance affect the exten-
sive margin of labor supply.
160 Note that the manner in which the effective taxes created by the design of the Ex-
change subsidies affects the extensive margin of labor supply is somewhat complicated by
the interaction between the Exchange subsidies and Medicaid; exploring the implications
of these interactions is beyond the scope of this Article.
161 For a definition of negative externalities, see David S. Gamage, Note, Taxing Political
Donations: The Case for Corrective Taxes in Campaign Finance, 113 Yale L.J. 1283, 1292
(2004).
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broader society, in addition to the taxpayers themselves. 162 Hence, to
the extent the ACA's effective taxes discourage low-income taxpayers
from accepting formal-sector employment, these effective taxes may
prove especially harmful.
Because an offer of employer-sponsored health insurance will result
in an employee's entire family being disqualified from the Exchange
subsidies163-as long as the employee's self-only coverage is afforda-
ble, and regardless of the cost of family coverage-the ACA will also
impose effective taxes on marriage. Imagine a couple with children
where one of the adults works for an employer that offers affordable
health insurance. If the couple marries, then the nonemployee spouse
and children will be made ineligible for the Exchange subsidies. Simi-
larly, if the couple is already married, then they can make the nonem-
ployee spouse and children qualify for the Exchange subsidies by
divorcing. Hence, for many low-income families, the ACA will im-
pose thousands of dollars in effective taxes on couples that choose to
be legally married.
There is some evidence that imposing effective taxes on marriage
can significantly affect behavior. 16 Moreover, marriage penalties
have historically had high political salience in tax law. 165 There may
well be political backlash once voters come to understand the extent
of the marriage penalties created by the ACA. And many commenta-
tors seem to agree that there is something inherently wrong with tax
law imposing high marriage penalties even apart from efficiency
concerns.
166
The ACA's effective taxes both on marriage and on accepting jobs
that offer affordable health coverage could be considerably mitigated
by basing the affordability of employer-sponsored health insurance
for employees with families on the cost of family coverage, rather than
on the cost of the employee's self-only coverage. A number of com-
mentators have suggested that the text of new § 36B is sufficiently
ambiguous that Treasury could interpret the affordability test for em-
162 Edmund S. Phelps, Rewarding Work: How to Restore Participation and Self-Sup-
port to Free Enterprise 38-48 (1997).
163 See note 102 and accompanying text.
164 Kasey S. Buckles, Melanie Guldi & Joseph Price, Changing the Price of Marriage:
Evidence from Blood Test Requirements 24-25 (2009), available at http://www.nd.edu/
-kbuckles/BGP nber.pdf ("We have shown that even small changes in the cost of marriage
can have significant effects, particularly for certain populations.").
165 See Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for
the Perplexed, 54 Tax L. Rev. 1, 4-11 (2000) (discussing the political history of the debate
over marriage penalties).
166 See Leslie A. Whittington & James Alm, Marriage Penalty, NTA Encyclopedia of
Taxation and Tax Policy 13 (2d ed. 1999) ("The principal arguments revolve around equity
issues.").
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ployees with families as being based on the cost of family coverage. 167
Treasury's indication in its proposed regulations that the affordability
test will be based on the cost of employee's self-only coverage has
thus been strongly criticized .168
Analyzing whether Treasury would have the authority to interpret
§ 36B so that the affordability test for employees with families would
be based on the cost of family coverage is beyond the scope of this
Article. It is worth noting, however, that the Treasury interpretation
follows an earlier technical explanation by the Joint Committee on
Taxation, 169 and that the Congressional Budget Office's official scor-
ing of the cost of the ACA was also based on this interpretation. 170 In
any case, it is worth discussing the policy considerations underlying
this question. If the affordability test were based on the cost of family
coverage, rather than self-only coverage, then a secondary question
would arise as to whether employers who offered affordable self-only
coverage but unaffordable family coverage would be subject to the
§ 4980H(b) employer-mandate penalties.
If these employers would be subject to the § 4980H(b) employer-
mandate penalties, then employers would need to offer affordable
family coverage in order to avoid those penalties. Arguably, it is not
reasonable to expect the employers of low- and moderate-income
workers to offer affordable family coverage, as this would dramati-
cally increase the cost of hiring those workers. And rising health care
costs would exacerbate this problem over time. Moreover, employers
would face strong incentives to not hire employees with families to the
167 Peter Gosselin, New Rule Could Narrow Aid for Health-Plan Buyers and Shrink
Insurers' Sales 3 (Bloomberg Gov't Study, Sept. 27, 2011). ("But the law is not quite as
clear what type of coverage it intends the individual's contribution to go toward--coverage
for just the individual or his or her family. And, to the extent the measure appears to apply
the contribution to individual-only coverage, many observers thought the result was suffi-
ciently unfair that Treasury and the IRS would use their regulation-writing authority to
address the matter.").
168 See, e.g., id. at 20-21; Larry Levitt & Gary Claxton, Measuring the Affordability of
Employer Health Coverage, Henry J. Kaiser Fam. Found. Health Reform Source (Aug. 24,
2011), http://healthreform.kff.org/notes-on-health-insurance-and-reform/201l/august/mea-
suring-the-affordability-of-employer-health-coverage.aspx?utm-source=feedburner&utm-
medium=feed&utmcampaign=Feed%3A+NotesOnHL+%28Notes+on+Health+Insur-
ance+and+Reform+ %28Headlines %29+-+Kaiser%27s+Health+Reform+Source% 29.
169 Joint Comm. on Tax'n, General Explanation of Tax Legislation Enacted in the 111th
Congress 265 (Comm. Print 2011) ("Unaffordable is defined as coverage with a premium
required to be paid by the employee that is more than 9.5 percent of the employee's house-
hold income, based on the self-only coverage"); see also Prop. Reg. § 1.36B-
2(c)(3)(v)(A)(1), 76 Fed. Reg. 50931, 50943 (Aug. 17, 2011) (incorporating the Joint Com-
mittee's interpretation).
170 See Richard V. Burkhauser, Sean Lyons & Kosali Simon, An Offer You Can't Re-
fuse: Estimating the Coverage Effects of the 2010 Affordable Care Act 5 n.5 (Emp. Poli-
cies Inst., 2011), available at http://epionline.org/studies/110715EPIAnOfferYouCant
RefusePolicyBriefFinal.pdf.
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extent they could legally do so. Perhaps most problematic, the
§ 498011(b) employer-mandate penalties are probably not high
enough to incentivize employers to offer affordable family cover-
age.171 If a significant number of employers were to decide against
offering affordable family coverage, or to drop offering coverage all
together, then this could substantially increase the budgetary cost of
the Exchange subsidies. 172
Conversely, if employers offering affordable self-only coverage, but
unaffordable family coverage, would not be subject to the § 4980H(b)
employer-mandate penalties, then employers would have strong in-
centives to make family coverage unaffordable for low- and moder-
ate-income workers. Employers could shift any funds previously used
to subsidize family coverage to instead increase the subsidies for self-
only coverage. According to a study by the Employment Policies In-
stitute, "it could be in the interest of a surprisingly large number of
employees-and their employers-to change their current contracts
so that otherwise-ineligible workers will be able to receive the ex-
change subsidy."'1 73 This would dramatically increase the budgetary
cost of the Exchange subsidies. 17 4
Returning to the reason why the ACA denies the Exchange subsi-
dies to employees with offers of affordable employer-sponsored
health insurance: The drafters of the ACA wanted the Exchange sub-
sidies to make insurance affordable for those who were previously un-
insured, but also wanted to limit the budgetary cost of the Exchange
subsidies by not making the subsidies available to those who previ-
ously received affordable health insurance from their employers. In
order to prevent employers from dropping health insurance so that
their employees could take advantage of the Exchange subsidies, the
ACA thus also includes the employer-mandate penalties and the new
nondiscrimination rules. It is this framework for limiting the budget-
ary cost of the Exchange subsidies that creates most of the effective
taxes discussed in this Article.
Basing the affordability test on the cost of family coverage would
mitigate the effective taxes on marriage and on accepting jobs that
offer affordable health insurance, but only by eroding the firewall that
the ACA creates on the availability of the Exchange subsidies and
thereby greatly increasing the budgetary cost of the Exchange subsi-
171 And strengthening the employer-mandate penalties (which would require legislative
action) would exacerbate another form of effective taxes on low- and moderate-income
workers, as discussed in Section IV.B.
172 Lacking offers of affordable employer-sponsored coverage, many more low-income
workers and their families would qualify for the Exchange subsidies.
173 Burkhauser et al., note 170, at *2.
174 Id. at *4.
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dies.175 Conversely, Treasury's proposed rule of basing affordability
on the cost of self-only coverage maintains the firewall and thereby
contains the budgetary cost of the Exchange subsidies, but at the price
of greatly exacerbating the ACA's effective taxes. Moreover, as ex-
plained by the Employment Policy Institute, Treasury's proposed rule
means that "millions of families will be stuck in a no-man's-land with-
out affordable coverage through their employer or the exchange-
since family members of an employee with an offer of coverage are
disqualified from accessing subsidized exchange coverage.' 1 76
B. The Effective Taxes Created by the Employer Penalties
To the extent that employers decide to offer affordable health insur-
ance to their low- and moderate-income employees, the ACA will cre-
ate effective taxes primarily due to the design of the Exchange
subsidies. 177 Conversely, to the extent that employers decide against
offering affordable health insurance to their low- and moderate-in-
come employees, the ACA will create effective taxes primarily
through the employer penalties.1 7 s Both the new § 4980H employer-
mandate penalties and the new nondiscrimination rules will impose
effective taxes on low- and moderate-income workers when employ-
ers decide against offering affordable health insurance. 179 Moreover,
these employer penalties will impose effective taxes regardless of
whether employers actually end up paying the penalties or whether
employers instead reorganize their business operations so as to avoid
being subject to the penalties.
175 Basing the affordability test on the cost of family coverage would not necessarily
mitigate the effective taxes on increasing household income, as these effective taxes result
from the Exchange subsidies phasing out as household income increases rather than from
the Exchange subsidies being unavailable to taxpayers with offers of affordable employer-
sponsored health insurance.
176 Id.
177 Of course, to the extent that the employer penalties are what cause employers to
offer affordable health insurance to their low- and moderate-income employees, it would
be more accurate to say that the effective taxes are caused by the interaction between the
design of the Exchange subsidies and the employer penalties. The effective taxes I analyze
in Section IV.A are thus not entirely distinct from the effective taxes I discuss in this Sec-
tion. In many respects, effective taxes impacting employees are equivalent to effective
taxes impacting employers, with the ultimate result depending on the incidence of the ef-
fective taxes. Nevertheless, despite the overlap between the effective taxes discussed in
these two Sections, I have separated the two discussions for ease of exposition.
178 The effective taxes created by the Exchange subsidies phasing out as household in-
come increases will also apply when employers do not offer affordable health coverage.
See notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
179 These employer penalties also impose effective taxes when employers do offer af-
fordable health insurance, due to the design of the Exchange subsidies, but these effective
taxes were discussed in the previous Section.
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The effective taxes that will be created when employers are subject
to the § 4980H employer-mandate penalties are relatively straightfor-
ward.180 When employers become subject to the § 4980H(b) em-
ployer-mandate penalties (of between $2000 and $3000 annually,
adjusted for inflation), the penalties will raise the cost of hiring em-
ployees who qualify for the Exchange subsidies. Economists generally
agree that raising the cost to employers of hiring low- and moderate-
income workers will lead employers to reduce those workers' salaries,
hire fewer low- and moderate-income workers, or implement some
combination of these two coping strategies. 18' The § 4980H(b) em-
ployer-mandate penalties will thus function as an effective tax on em-
ploying low- and moderate-income workers. 82
The new nondiscrimination rules may similarly function as an effec-
tive tax on employing low- and moderate-income workers, depending
on the extent to which these rules succeed in preventing employers
from offering affordable health insurance only to their higher-income
employees. The penalties for violating the new nondiscrimination
rules are extremely severe-at $100 per day per affected employee. 183
Consequently, employers should not purposefully allow themselves to
become subject to the penalties for violating the new nondiscrimina-
tion rules. Instead, employers should either offer health insurance in
a nondiscriminatory fashion or else stop offering health insurance
altogether.
To the extent that the new nondiscrimination rules motivate em-
ployers to stop offering health insurance even to their higher-income
employees, these employers' low- and moderate-income employees
will be able to qualify for the Exchange subsidies. But because these
employers will be unable to offer their higher income employees the
benefit of the tax exclusions, the new nondiscrimination rules will
raise the costs to these employers of offering attractive compensation
packages to their higher-income employees. These increased costs
will function as effective taxes in that the employers will need to make
180 As discussed in Section III.C, employers should generally be able to avoid paying the
§ 4980H(a) employer-mandate penalties by offering unaffordable health insurance to their
low- and moderate-income employees. Consequently, the § 4980H(a) employer-mandate
penalties should not create significant effective taxes.
181 See, e.g., Monahan & Schwarcz, note 26, at 182-83 ("Most economists agree that
health care costs are simply part of employees' total compensation. Decreased health in-
surance costs may consequently tend to translate into increased salaries."); Lawrence H.
Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 Am. Econ. Rev. 177, 181-82
(1989); see also note 184 and accompanying text.
182 For further discussion, see John Goodman, The $6-an-Hour Health Minimum Wage,
John Goodman's Health Pol'y Blog (Oct. 18, 2010), http://healthblog.ncpa.org/the-6-an-
hour-min-wage/.
183 42 U.S.C. 300gg-22(b)(2)(c)(i).
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adjustments in order to offset for the increased costs. Some portion of
the incidence of these effective taxes will affect the employers' hiring
of low- and moderate-income employees (while another portion will
affect the employers' hiring of higher-income employees). Hence, in
addition to the effective taxes the new § 4980H employer-mandate
penalties will impose on hiring low- and moderate-income employees,
the new nondiscrimination rules will impose additional effective taxes
to the extent that the nondiscrimination rules interfere with the em-
ployers' offering attractive compensation packages to their higher-in-
come employees.
Rather than allowing themselves to be subject to the new § 4980H
employer-mandate penalties or the new nondiscrimination rules,
many employers will reorganize their business operations so as to
qualify for exceptions to these rules. In particular, employers may
shift some of their low- and moderate-income workers to part-time
positions.184 Neither the § 4980H employer-mandate penalties nor
the new nondiscrimination rules apply to part-time employees, with
part-time defined as employees working an average of less than thirty
hours per week with respect to the § 4980H employer-mandate penal-
ties185 and as employees working less than thirty-five hours per week
with respect to the nondiscrimination rules.186 By moving their low-
and moderate-income employees to part-time status, employers can
avoid having to either offer these employees affordable health insur-
ance or be subject to the employer-mandate penalties or the nondis-
crimination rules.
Moreover, low- and moderate-income employees should often pre-
fer to work part-time and not be offered affordable health insurance
than to work full time while being offered affordable health insur-
ance. 187 Shifting their low- and moderate-income employees to part-
time status can thus facilitate employers maximizing the value of the
health care tax benefits for all employees, as lower income employees
would be eligible for the Exchange subsidies and higher-income em-
184 See Diana Furchtgott-Roth, Job Creation and the Affordable Care Act, 132 Tax
Notes 1289, 1289 (Sept. 19, 2011) ("That combination of taxes gives businesses a powerful
incentive to downsize, replace full-time employees with part timers, and contract work out
to other firms or individuals.").
185 IRC § 4980H(c)(4).
186 PPACA, § 1001, 124 Stat. at 884 (amending § 2716 of the Public Health Service Act,
Pub. L. No. 78-410, 58 Stat. 682 (1944)), provides that group health plans (other than self-
insured plans) must satisfy rules "similar to" the § 105(h) rules governing self-insured
plans. Because full guidance interpreting PHSA § 2716 has yet to be released, there is
uncertainty on how the "similar to" language will be applied. That caveat aside, § 1.105-
11(c)(2)(iii)(c) of the regulations specifies that part-time employees (generally defined as
employees working less than thirty-five hours per week) are excluded from the § 105(h)
nondiscrimination rules.
187 See notes 146-54 and accompanying text.
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ployees for the tax exclusions-all without the employer being subject
to either the § 4980H employer-mandate penalties or the new nondis-
crimination rules.
Moving low- and moderate-income workers to part-time status is
probably among the most promising strategies employers might use to
reorganize their business operations so as to avoid the employer-man-
date penalties and the nondiscrimination rules. But many alternative
strategies may also be available. For instance, employers might re-
place some of their employees with independent contractors or move
their low- and moderate-income employees into separate business di-
visions from their higher-income employees. 188 With respect to the
nondiscrimination rules, it is not yet clear whether offering unafford-
able insurance to lower-income employees would even be considered
discriminatory if the insurance is offered on similar terms to all em-
ployees.189 Until final guidance is released interpreting both § 4980H
and the new nondiscrimination rules, it would be premature to at-
tempt a full analysis of possible avoidance strategies; nevertheless,
many high-priced law firms and consulting firms are undoubtedly al-
ready hard at work designing these strategies. 190
To the extent employers can effectively implement avoidance strat-
egies and thereby offer affordable health insurance only to their
higher-income employees, the budgetary cost of the Exchange subsi-
dies may be much higher than predicted. The purpose of the § 4980H
employer-mandate penalties and the new nondiscrimination rules is to
contain the cost of the Exchange subsidies by denying those subsidies
to employees with offers of affordable employer-sponsored health in-
surance. The CBO scored the budgetary cost of the ACA based on
the assumption that most employees who had offers of affordable em-
ployer-sponsored health insurance prior to the ACA will continue to
have those offers after the ACA comes into effect. 191 The CBO's esti-
mates appear to assume that few employers will be able to use avoid-
ance techniques so as to offer affordable health insurance only to their
188 See Furchtgott-Roth, note 184, at 1289-90; Eugene Steuerle, Health Care Reform:
Implications of a Two Subsidy System *13 (2009), available at http://www.urban.org/
uploadedpdf/509103_healthcarereform.pdf.
189 Insurance offered on similar terms to all employees could end up being unaffordable
to lower-income employees due to the simple fact that lower-income employees have less
income with which to purchase insurance. For further discussion, see Section III.C.
190 For the most recent update on the status of the proposed guidance interpreting
§ 4980H, as of the time of this writing, see Notice 2012-17, 2012-1 C.B. 430.
191 See Cong. Budget Office, CBO's Analysis of the Major Health Care Legislation En-
acted in March 2010, at 20 (2011), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/ftpdocs/121xx/docl2l19/03-30-healthcarelegislation.pdf (discussing the CBO's esti-
mates for the number of employers dropping health coverage and stating "[s]ome com-
mentators have expressed surprise that CBO and JCT do not expect a much larger
reduction in employment-based insurance coverage").
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higher-income employees. 192 If employers can successfully offer af-
fordable health insurance only to their higher-income employees, then
a much larger number of taxpayers will be eligible for the Exchange
subsidies than the CBO predicted, greatly increasing the budgetary
cost of the Exchange subsidies.193
Moreover, employers will need to incur costs in order to reorganize
their business operations. For instance, if an employer relied on full-
time workers prior to the ACA, this implies that hiring full-time work-
ers made more sense from a business perspective as compared to hir-
ing part-time workers. If the ACA induces the employer to switch to
hiring part-time workers in order to avoid the employer-mandate pen-
alties or the nondiscrimination rules, this will create costs for the em-
ployer to the extent that hiring part-time workers would otherwise
make less business sense than would hiring full-time workers.
Most any strategy employers might use to reorganize their business
operations to avoid the employer-mandate penalties or the nondis-
crimination rules will create costs for the employer. And at least some
of the incidence of these costs will fall on low- and moderate-income
workers-to the extent the costs lead employers to reduce hiring or to
reduce salaries. And even to the extent the incidence of these costs
falls on higher-income workers (or on owners, managers, or custom-
ers), this will still create economic harm.194
Overall then, without further reforms, the ACA will impose costly
effective taxes on low- and moderate-income workers regardless of
how employers respond to the ACA's framework. These effective
taxes may be somewhat less severe if employers stop offering afforda-
192 See id. at 20-21 (arguing that employers will not stop offering affordable coverage to
their lower-income employees because the employers will not want to forgo offering their
higher-income employees the value of the tax exclusions and stating that the nondiscrimi-
nation rules will prevent employers from doing both).
193 The cost of the Exchange subsidies may greatly exceed the CBO's estimates even if
employers are able to avoid only the nondiscrimination rules but not the § 4980H em-
ployer-mandate penalties. As discussed in Section III.C, many low-income employees
would receive more net benefit from the Exchange subsidies than from being offered af-
fordable employer-sponsored insurance even when employers are subject to the § 4980H
penalties. But if employers can avoid being subject to both the § 4980H penalties and the
nondiscrimination rules, employers will have incentives to stop offering affordable cover-
age for a much larger number of low- and moderate-income employees.
On the other hand, if the ACA fails in fixing the problems of the individual market such
that Exchange coverage remains significantly inferior to employer-sponsored coverage,
then employers will face much less incentive to stop offering affordable health insurance to
their low- and moderate-income employees. Yet few supporters of the ACA are likely to
be comforted by the idea of costs being contained through the ACA failing in one of its
primary goals.
194 Because the penalty savings that induce employers to incur these costs represent
money lost to the government, the costs create pure losses from a social welfare
perspective.
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ble health insurance to their low- and moderate-income employees.
But then the budgetary cost of the Exchange subsidies will likely be
much higher than predicted. Although it is not yet clear which forms
of effective taxes will end up creating the most harm-partially be-
cause full regulatory guidance interpreting the employer-mandate
penalties and nondiscrimination rules has yet to be released-there is
little doubt that in the absence of further reforms both employees and
employers will face strong perverse incentives once key provisions of
the ACA come into effect in 2014. The next Part thus discusses how
the federal or state governments might act to mitigate or eliminate
these perverse incentives.
V. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM
Although this Article has focused on critiquing aspects of the ACA,
this Article should not be interpreted as a criticism of the ACA as a
whole. 195 If the ACA succeeds in fixing the individual market for
health insurance, that will (in my view) be an impressive accomplish-
ment.196 And the ACA includes many provisions designed to slow the
growth of health care costs, to expand health care coverage to the
previously uninsured, and to achieve other laudable goals. 197 That the
ACA will also impose costly effective taxes on low- and moderate-
income workers does not mean that these workers would be better off
without the ACA.198 After all, most of the effective taxes that the
195 See notes 6 and 14 and accompanying text.
196 It is by no means clear whether the ACA will succeed in fixing the individual market
for health insurance (even ignoring the threat of legal or political challenges). For papers
discussing some of the issues that will need to be resolved in order for the ACA to be
successful in this endeavor, see Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Insurance Exchanges and
the Affordable Care Act: Eight Difficult Issues (Commonwealth Fund, 2010), available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2010/Sepl
1444_Jost-hit ins exchangesACA-eight-difficultissues..v2.pdf; Sarah Lueck, States
Should Structure Insurance Exchanges to Minimize Adverse Selection (Ctr. on Budget &
Pol'y Priorities, 2010), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/8-17-10health.pdf; Monahan &
Schwarcz, note 26; Pamela Farley Short, Katherine Swartz, Namrata Uberoi & Deborah
Graefe, Realizing Health Reform's Potential: Maintaining Coverage, Affordability, and
Shared Responsibility When Income and Employment Change (Commonwealth Fund,
2011), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/Files/Publications/Is-
sue %20Brief/201 1/May/1503_Shortmaintainingcoverage-affordability-reformbrief.pdf;
Benjamin D. Sommers & Sara Rosenbaum, Issues in Health Reform: How Changes in
Eligibility May Move Millions Back and Forth Between Medicaid and Insurance Ex-
changes, 30 Health Aff. 228 (2011).
197 There are many explanations of the various provisions of the ACA. My favorite is a
video produced by the Kaiser Family Foundation. Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Health
Reform Hits Main Street, http://healthreform.kff.org/the-animation.aspx (last visited Aug.
15, 2012).
198 Or, more precisely, these costly effective taxes do not imply that low- and moderate-
income workers as a class would be better off without the ACA. The ACA will almost
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ACA will impose on these workers will only arise to the extent that
the ACA successfully improves the health insurance available on the
individual market and offers generous subsidies to make that insur-
ance affordable to low- and moderate-income taxpayers. 199
But recognizing the ACA's positive achievements should not dis-
tract from understanding the costs that the ACA will impose through
effective taxes. To the extent that the ACA successfully incentivizes
employers to continue offering affordable health insurance to their
low- and moderate-income employees, the ACA will strongly discour-
age low- and moderate-income taxpayers from marrying or staying
married and from accepting jobs that offer affordable health insur-
ance. Conversely, if numerous employers stop offering affordable
health insurance to their low- and moderate-income employees, then
the budgetary costs of the Exchange subsidies will likely greatly ex-
ceed the CBO's projections and the ACA will disincentive employers
from hiring low- and moderate-income workers. To summarize, how-
ever employers respond to the ACA's framework, the ACA's perverse
incentives will reduce employment opportunities for low- and moder-
ate-income Americans as well as creating other economic and social
harms.
If these perverse incentives were unavoidable, then perhaps we
should view them as a necessary cost of achieving the ACA's desirable
ends. Yet the ACA's laudable goals could have been attained without
imposing most of the effective taxes discussed in this Article. Through
further reforms, we can strive to realize the promised benefits of the
ACA while preventing many of its costs.
The mismatch between the tax subsidies available for Exchange
coverage and those available for employer-sponsored coverage are
the source of most of the perverse incentives that the ACA will create
with respect to low- and moderate-income workers.200 Yet there is a
certainly create net benefits for some low- and moderate-income workers and net costs for
others. See note 15.
199 As noted previously, most of the effective taxes discussed in this Article only arise to
the extent that the ACA succeeds in fixing the individual market so that the insurance
available on the individual market is competitive with employer-sponsored coverage. See
note 114 and accompanying text. Throughout most of this Article, I have assumed that the
ACA will succeed in fixing the individual market. But this assumption is made for ease of
exposition. It remains to be seen whether (and to what extent) the ACA will improve the
individual market to the degree necessary to make the insurance offered on the Exchanges
competitive with employer-provided offerings.
200 The major effective taxes that do not arise from the mismatch between the tax subsi-
dies for employer-sponsored coverage and those for Exchange coverage (or from the
ACA's provisions designed to incentivize employers to continue offering affordable health
insurance to low- and moderate-income employees despite this mismatch) are the effec-
tive taxes that result from how the Exchange subsidies phase out as household income
increases. See Section IV.A. This Article's argument for replacing the tax exclusions with
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relatively simple fix for this mismatch. The ACA could have been
drafted to replace the tax exclusions for employer-provided health in-
surance with refundable tax credits structured similarly to the Ex-
change subsidies.
Ideally, the ACA would have replaced the tax exclusions for em-
ployer-sponsored health insurance with refundable tax credits offering
the same value as the Exchange subsidies.201 If-for any given level
of household income-a taxpayer would obtain the exact same subsi-
dies for either employer-sponsored coverage or for Exchange cover-
age, then there would be no perverse incentives affecting either
marriage or accepting jobs that offer affordable health insurance.
Moreover, there would be no need for the employer-mandate penal-
ties or the nondiscrimination rules, as employers would not face any
perverse incentives to stop offering health coverage to their low- and
moderate-income employees. Instead, Exchange coverage and em-
ployer-sponsored coverage could compete on a level playing field,
with neither benefitting from a larger tax advantage.202
Many previous commentators have called for replacing the tax ex-
clusions with refundable tax credits on the grounds that the tax exclu-
refundable tax credits for employer-sponsored coverage designed in a similar fashion to
the Exchange subsidies would thus not eliminate the effective taxes created by the manner
in which the subsidies phase out as household income increases. To eliminate these effec-
tive taxes, the tax subsidies available both on and off of the Exchanges would need to be
redesigned so that they do not phase out with income, in effect making them available for
high income taxpayers as well as for low- and moderate-income taxpayers (like a
demogrant). Analyzing the tradeoffs involved in addressing the effective taxes created by
the manner in which the tax subsidies phase out as household income increases is beyond
the scope of this Article. For further discussion, see Chandler, note 151.
201 If repealing the tax exclusions would not generate sufficient revenue to make tax
credits of similar magnitude to the Exchange subsidies available to all low- and moderate-
income workers with employer-sponsored coverage, then I would argue that some of the
funding for the Exchange subsidies should be moved to funding the new credits for em-
ployer-sponsored coverage so that equivalent health care subsidies would be available both
on and off the Exchanges. There might be some justifications for subsidizing Exchange
coverage more than employer-sponsored coverage, as bringing a critical mass of insureds
to Exchange coverage is important for combating adverse selection. But there does not
appear to be any good reason for incentivizing only low- and moderate-income taxpayers
to receive Exchange coverage while incentivizing higher-income taxpayers to receive em-
ployer-sponsored coverage, as the ACA will do as it is currently structured. Even if we
cannot completely eliminate the effective taxes that the ACA will impose with respect to
low- and moderate-income workers, we should strive to mitigate these effective taxes, by
equalizing the tax subsidies available on and off of the Exchanges, to the extent possible.
202 A question underlying much of health care policy is whether the U.S. system of rely-
ing primarily on employer-sponsored coverage should be maintained or eroded. This Arti-
cle takes no position on this question. Instead, this Article's suggested reforms would
permit Exchange coverage and employer-sponsored coverage to compete on an even play-
ing field, without either enjoying a significantly greater tax advantage. Whether Exchange
coverage would replace employer-sponsored coverage, then, would depend on which form
of coverage could offer better value at lower cost.
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sions are regressive and that they encourage excess health care
consumption. 2 3 This Article's key contribution is to show that failing
to replace the tax exclusions with refundable tax credits will create far
more harm once key provisions of the ACA go into effect in 2014. In
addition to being regressive and encouraging excess health care con-
sumption, retaining the tax exclusions in their current form will im-
pose costly effective taxes on low- and moderate-income workers.
Fortunately, there is some cause for hope. Many Republicans have
already embraced the idea of replacing the tax exclusions with refund-
able tax credits as part of their vision for reforming health care. Re-
placing the tax exclusions with refundable tax credits was a
centerpiece of Senator McCain's health care plan when he ran for
President in 2008.204 And, more recently, Republican House Budget
Committee Chairman Paul Ryan has argued for replacing the tax ex-
clusions with refundable tax credits as part of his "Path to Prosperity"
plan.20 5 If Democrats can be convinced of the importance of replacing
the tax exclusions with refundable tax credits in order to avoid the
costly effective taxes that the ACA will otherwise impose on low- and
moderate-income workers, then there may be room for a bipartisan
compromise based on the Republicans' proposals. Even if such a
compromise is not possible at the federal level within the current
hyper-partisan atmosphere surrounding health care discussions in
Washington, 20 6 there may still be hope after President Obama leaves
office and the vitriolic debate over the enactment of the ACA recedes
into more distant memory.
Looking first to how reforms might be enacted at the federal level,
replacing the tax exclusions for employer-provided health insurance
203 See, e.g., Goldberg & Camic, note 53, at 1; Gruber, note 12, at *7-*8; John Holahan,
Linda J. Blumberg, Stacey McMorrow, Stephen Zuckerman, Timothy Waidmann & Karen
Stockley, Containing the Growth of Spending in the U.S. Health System 11-13 (Urban Inst.
Health Pol'y Ctr., 2011) available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412419-Contain-
ing-the-Growth-of-Spending-in-the-US-Health-System-Summary.pdf; President's Advisory
Panel, note 12, at 78-82.
204 Goldberg & Camic, note 53 at 3; Lucinda E. Jesson, Beyond Efficiency: Creating
Health Policy Through the Tax Code 21, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1695673.
205 Avik Roy, Paul Ryan, in a Major Speech, Proposes Universal Health Coverage Via
Tax Credits, Forbes Apothecary Blog (Sept. 28, 2011, 10:43 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/aroy/2011/09/28/paul-ryan-in-a-major-speech-proposes-universal-health-coverage-via-
tax-credits/.
206 It is worth noting that key Republican legislators have made it clear that the House
will not pass any measures designed to improve the Affordable Care Act, even if the mea-
sures would otherwise have been noncontroversial or would have been supported by
Republicans. At the time of this writing, many Republican legislators would apparently
prefer for the ACA to be as ineffective and harmful as they can make it, so that the Repub-
licans can score political points against Democrats. Hopefully, Republicans will be more
open to improving the ACA in the future, after further election cycles have passed.
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with refundable tax credits would involve at least two design chal-
lenges. First, because the tax exclusions primarily benefit higher-in-
come taxpayers, whereas refundable tax credits would primarily
benefit lower-income taxpayers, replacing the tax exclusions with re-
fundable tax credits would have significant distributional implications.
In my view, the additional progressivity that could be achieved by re-
placing the tax exclusions with refundable tax credits is a positive fea-
ture of this reform proposal.20 7 Nevertheless, for those who would
oppose increasing the progressivity of the federal income tax system,
it is possible to replace the tax exclusions with refundable tax credits
in a distributionally neutral fashion. All that is needed is to adjust the
federal income tax rates and brackets so as to offset the distributional
impact of replacing the tax exclusions with refundable tax credits. 208
Of course, offsetting the distributional impact of replacing the tax
exclusions with refundable tax credits would still create winners and
losers. Within each income group, taxpayers who received greater
benefit from the tax exclusions (as compared to the new refundable
tax credits) would see their tax burdens rise, whereas taxpayers who
received less benefit from the tax exclusions would see their tax bur-
dens reduced. Whether these consequences should be considered pos-
itive or negative depends on the extent to which we view health
expenditures as a form of consumption or as reflecting that a taxpayer
has lower wellbeing in a manner relevant for assessing tax burdens.209
Perhaps the best argument against offering refundable tax credits for
purchasing health insurance is the notion that the tax system should
not subsidize health care as compared to other expenditures.210 Yet
207 Previous scholars and policy advocates who have criticized the tax exclusions as be-
ing regressive can be viewed as implicitly agreeing with my assessment that it would be
desirable to increase progressivity by replacing the tax exclusions with refundable tax
credits.
208 See Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 Has-
tings L.J. 343, 360-63 (1989) (explaining how tax-rate adjustments can be used to counter-
act the distributional impact of adding or eliminating income tax deductions).
209 The classic debate on this topic in the legal literature is between Mark Kelman, Per-
sonal Deductions Revisited: Why They fit Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Why They
Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 831 (1979), and William D. Andrews,
Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 309 (1972).
210 It is perhaps conceivable to oppose replacing the tax exclusions based on the argu-
ment that higher-income taxpayers with significant health care expenses should receive a
deduction because these health care expenditures indicate that these taxpayers have dimin-
ished well-being (following the argument in Andrews, note 209), and that this concern
should trump the health policy advantages of replacing the tax exclusions with refundable
tax credits. I am skeptical as to whether this position deserves to be taken seriously.
Nonetheless, were this position to win the day, then the optimal policy would probably be
to both retain the tax exclusions and to add new refundable tax credits for employer-spon-
sored health insurance of similar magnitude to the Exchange subsidies. This policy could
be paid for by increasing tax rates, and perhaps also by reducing the health care subsidies
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this argument suggests that the ACA's Exchange subsidies should
probably be repealed, which would arguably require dismantling
much of the ACA's framework for regulating health insurance. 211 For
those amenable to offering tax subsidies to make health care afforda-
ble for lower-income Americans, distributional considerations should
not defeat the case for replacing the tax exclusions with refundable tax
credits. 212
The second design challenge for replacing the tax exclusions with
refundable tax credits concerns whether the new refundable tax cred-
its would need to be made advanceable. The premium tax credits that
the ACA will make available to subsidize Exchange coverage will be
advanceable; taxpayers will be able to apply for advanced payment of
these premium tax credits in order to pay for health insurance without
waiting until the taxpayers file tax returns.2 13 For taxpayers who re-
ceive higher or lower advanced payments than the amount of the pre-
mium tax credits they are determined to be eligible for upon filing
their tax returns, there will be a reconciliation process wherein taxpay-
ers may be required to repay any excess amount of advanced pay-
ments received.
The Exchanges, HHS, and IRS will face numerous challenges in im-
plementing the processes for the advanced payment of the premium
tax credits and for the reconciliation of the advanced payments.214
Making refundable tax credits advanceable in the context of em-
ployer-sponsored health insurance is potentially an easier task. Per-
haps the simplest mechanism for making refundable tax credits
available on the Exchanges. Even if the tax exclusions cannot be eliminated as a means of
paying for new refundable tax credits, it remains important to equalize the health care
subsidies available on and off the Exchanges to the extent possible in order to mitigate the
effective taxes analyzed in this Article.
211 Due to adverse selection problems and the cost of health care, any system that offers
lower-income taxpayers affordable health care options must probably include some form
of subsidization.
212 For those (like myself) who favor increasing tax progressivity, the tax exclusions
could be replaced with refundable tax credits without the need for further adjustments.
For those who oppose increasing tax progressivity, tax-rate adjustments could be used to
maintain the existing progressivity of the federal income tax system. Of course, in practice,
any policy adopted is likely to reflect a political compromise. Yet the point remains that
those who oppose increasing tax progressivity might be convinced to support replacing the
tax exclusions with refundable tax credits as long as this reform is combined with some
other tax policy change that this group desires.
213 Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Reconciliation of Advance Payments for Health In-
surance Subsidies, (Focus on Health Reform No. 8154, Feb. 2011), available at http://www.
kff.orgfhealthreformlupload/8154.pdf.
214 E.g., Pamela Farley Short, Katherine Swartz, Namrata Uberoi & Deborah Graefe,
Realizing Health Reform's Potential: Maintaining Coverage, Affordability, and Shared
Responsibility When Income and Employment Change (Commonwealth Fund Pub. 1503,
May 2011), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/Files/Publications/Is-
sue%20Brief/201 1/May/1503-Short-maintaining__coverage-affordability-reformbrief.pdf.
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advanceable for employer-sponsored health insurance is to adjust in-
come-tax withholding levels to reflect taxpayers' expected health care
tax credits.215 In any case, the same information that employers and
employees use to determine income tax withholding levels can be
used to estimate the amounts of the health care tax credits that should
be made advanceable. 216
A full discussion of how a system of refundable tax credits for em-
ployer-sponsored health insurance might be implemented is beyond
the scope of this Article. There are already numerous such discus-
sions in the existing literature, 217 reflecting the fact that conservative
economists and think tanks frequently advocated replacing the tax ex-
clusions with refundable tax credits prior to Obama's election in
2008.218 As long as the new refundable tax credits offer similar value
to the ACA's Exchange subsidies, the ACA's employer-mandate pen-
alties and nondiscrimination rules would be made unnecessary.
Hence, by replacing the tax exclusions with refundable tax credits and
then repealing the ACA's employer-mandate penalties and new non-
discrimination rules, the federal government could mitigate or elimi-
nate the perverse incentives analyzed in this Article.
If the federal government fails to act, then there is some potential
for state governments to pass legislation to mitigate the perverse in-
centives analyzed in this Article. As a first step, any state with an
income tax could eliminate its state-level tax exclusions for employer-
sponsored health insurance. Beyond that first step, states could im-
pose additional taxes on employer-sponsored health insurance and
then use the revenues collected to fund state-level refundable tax
credits for health insurance purchased outside of the Exchanges. A
state could potentially impose a tax on employer-sponsored health in-
surance designed to capture approximately the entire amount of the
215 Some of the current rules related to income tax withholding can be found on the IRS
website. See http://www.irs.govlndividuals/EmployeesTax-Withholding.
216 In contrast, the primary difficulties the Exchanges, HHS, and IRS will face in imple-
menting the reconciliation processes for the advance payment of the premium tax credits
results from their lacking current verifiable information about taxpayers' salaries and em-
ployment statuses. See id. at 5-8.
217 Nina Owcharenko, Health Care Tax Credits: Designing an Alternative to Employer-
Based Coverage n.26( Heritage Found. Backgrounder No. 1895 (Nov. 8, 2005), available at:
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/11/health-care-tax-credits-designing-an-al-
ternative-to-employer-based-coverage#-ftnref26 ("Many professional economists and a
wide range of analysts from the American Enterprise Institute, the Galen Institute, The
Heritage Foundation, the National Center for Policy Analysis, and the Progressive Policy
Institute have all proposed [replacing the tax exclusions with a unified universal tax credit
system], with various modifications.").
218 Id.
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federal tax exclusions.219 By then channeling the revenues collected
into state-level refundable tax credits for employer-sponsored health
insurance, a state could effectively implement most of the reforms that
I have proposed the federal government adopt.220 Of course, a state
government could not repeal the ACA's employer-mandate penalties
or nondiscrimination rules. But by fully or partially neutralizing the
federal tax exclusions and then offering a state-level refundable tax
credit for health insurance purchased outside of the Exchanges, a state
could considerably mitigate the perverse incentives analyzed in this
Article.
The ACA is a landmark accomplishment. Yet the task of reforming
the American health care system is far from complete.221 Rising
health care costs will force politicians to revisit health care reform in
the not-too-distant future.22 2 If the problem of the effective taxes that
the ACA will impose on low- and moderate-income workers cannot
be resolved sooner, then hopefully future rounds of health care re-
form can avoid the ACA's mistakes.22 3 It may be politically advanta-
geous to make explicit subsidies as high as possible and to keep
explicit taxes as low as possible.224 But if this results in creating costly
219 There is some question as to whether this policy might violate the Supremacy Clause
of the U.S. Constitution. On preliminary analysis, I think it would not, but a full discussion
of this issue must wait for future work.
220 Unlike the federal government, however, a state government cannot reduce the
amount of the Exchange subsidies if the state is unable to raise sufficient revenues to fund
tax credits for employer-sponsored health insurance of equivalent magnitude to the ACA's
Exchange subsidies. Yet the closer a state can come to offering refundable tax credits for
employer-sponsored health insurance of equivalent magnitude to the Exchange subsidies
the more the state will be able to mitigate the perverse incentives analyzed in this Article.
221 See Health-Care Reform Is an Ongoing Process, The Economist Democracy in Am.
Blog (Jan. 23, 2011, 8:04 PM) http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2011/
01/health-carereform ("Which is all to say that reform is an ongoing process.").
222 See David I. Auerbach & Arthur L. Kellermann, A Decade of Health Care Cost
Growth Has Wiped Out Real Income Gains for an Average Family, 30 Health Aff. 1630,
1630-34 (2011), (evaluating the burdens imposed by rising health care costs).
223 The focus of this Article is policy rather than politics. Nevertheless, it may be worth
noting that a major political obstacle to transforming the tax exclusions into refundable tax
credits is organized labor. Many unions support maintaining the tax exclusions, presuma-
bly based on the notion that the tax exclusions are important for maintaining the advan-
tages of employer-sponsored health insurance and that a major mechanism by which
unions provide value to their members is through unions' role in lobbying for and provid-
ing health insurance. See, e.g., Charles Lane, A Health Reform Hurdle: Labor's Cadillac
Benefits, Wash. Post, (Sept. 27, 2009), ("Organized labor's tooth-and-nail fight to protect
union health benefits is a significant -but underreported-obstacle to sensible health-care
reform .... And so labor defends the tax exclusion with every ounce of its considerable
clout."), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/25/
AR2009092502778.html
224 Pratt, note 117, at 161 ("Many Americans would not view an employer mandate as a
tax increase, even though they will ultimately bear the economic burden of the mandate.").
For a broad review of the literature related to the political salience of taxation and of
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effective taxes on important decisions affecting low- and moderate-
income workers, then the political advantages are not worth the costs.
In future health care debates, independent-minded commentators
should focus on the danger of creating effective taxes that harm low-
and moderate-income workers. These effective taxes will only be less
visible to the extent they are not brought into the light through op-eds
and other media discussions. By holding future politicians' feet to the
fire, we can strive for health care reform that will not create costly
perverse incentives for low- and moderate-income Americans.
government financing, see Gamage & Shanske, note 144, at 33-54. In particular, see the
discussion of tax-financed spending versus regulation. Id. at 53.
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